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FORD 

The  United  States  and  Spain  in 
1790 


E 

313 

F71 


WINNOWINGS  IN  AMERICAN  HISTORY. 

DIPLOMATIC  SERIES. 

No.  I. 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  SPAIN 


IN  1790. 


AN  EPISODE   IN  DIPLOMACY   DESCRIBED  FROM 
HITHERTO  UNPUBLISHED  SOURCES. 


WITH  AN  INTRODUCTION  BY 

WORTHINGTON  CHAUNCEY  FORD. 


BROOKLYN,  N.  Y.: 

HISTORICAL  PRINTING  CLUB. 
1890. 


25O  Copies  Printed. 
No.  


CONTENTS. 


PAGE 

Introduction 7 

Questions  of  the  President 43 

Reply  of  the  Vice-President,  John  Adams 45 

Opinion  of  the  Chief  Justice,  John  Jay 50 

Opinion  of  the  Secretary  of  State,  Thomas  Jefferson 56 

Heads  of  consideration  on  the  Navigation  of  the  Mississippi,  for 

Mr.  Carmichael,  by  Thomas  Jefferson 59 

Heads  of  consideration  on  the  conduct  we  are  to  observe  in  the 

war  between  Spain  and  Great  Britain,  and  particularly  should 

the  latter  attempt  the  conquest  of  Louisiana  and  the  Floridas. 

By  Thomas  Jefferson 65 

Hamilton  to  Washington,  15  September,  1790 68 

Opinion  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  Alexander  Hamilton  .  69 

Opinion  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  Henry  Knox 103 

Index 107 

(v) 


INTRODUCTION. 


THE  interest  of  the  papers  included  in  these  pages  lies  in 
the  light  they  throw  upon  the  first  question  of  diplomacy, 
which  confronted  the  newly  constituted  government  of  the 
United  States.  During  the  Revolution  diplomatic  relations 
with  European  powers  had  been  confined  to  offers  of  alli- 
ances, of  commercial  reciprocity  and  requests  for  financial 
aid ;  but  the  net  result  had  been  a  treaty  of  alliance  with 
France,  which  led  to  important  results  for  the  revolting  col- 
onies ;  a  treaty  of  commerce  with  the  same  nation,  that  was 
entirely  inoperative,  thanks  to  the  network  of  protective 
duties  and  prohibitions  that  closed  the  French  ports  to  out- 
side traders ;  and  a  few  parchments  involving  contracts  with 
other  nations  and  supposed  to  contain  concessions  that  might 
in  certain  contingencies  become  of  value,  but  rather  from 
their  moral  and  political  influence,  as  involving  a  recognition 
of  the  independence  of  America,  than  from  any  actual  bonds 
of  interest,  political  or  commercial.  Nor  had  the  foreign 
relations  of  the  States  improved  during  the  years  from  the 
treaty  of  peace  in  1783,  to  the  promulgation  of  the  new 
constitution  and  the  establishment  of  a  central  government. 
Great  Britain  recognized  the  independence  of  the  new 
nation,  but  refused  to  treat  with  it  politically  or  commer- 
cially under  formal  exchange  of  ministers  or  a  commercial 
treaty.  The  laws  of  trade  and  the  rigid  laws  of  the  mer- 
cantile system  gave  the  trade  of  America  into  British  hands ; 

(7) 


8 

and,  enjoying  a  natural  monopoly,  the  British  ministry  saw 
no  good  reason  for  jeopardizing  actual  profit  by  suggesting 
changes  that  might  prove  injurious.  To  purchase  by  con- 
cession what  they  were  already  in  the  full  enjoyment  of,  was 
not  recognized  as  good  policy ;  nor  was  it  more  agreeable 
to  them  to  open  diplomatic  relations  that  could  not  but  lead 
to  embarrassing  controversies.  There  were  charges  of  bad 
faith  in  the  execution  or  rather  evasion  of  the  terms  of  the 
treaty  of  1 783,  which  could  be  judged  of  only  by  a  tedious, 
difficult  and  extremely  delicate  weighing  of  claims  on  both 
sides.  The  Revolution  in  France  had  disarranged  the  rela- 
tions of  that  people  with  the  outside  world,  and  already  in 
America  a  feeling  was  engendered  that  a  too  close  connec- 
tion with  that  country  might  not  be  safe  or  expedient  for 
the  American  interests.  With  Spain,  there  were  still  the 
embarrassing  claims  and  denials  attending  the  free  naviga- 
tion of  the  Mississippi ;  while  the  problem  of  public  credit 
was  intimately  connected  with  the  relations  between  the 
United  States  and  their  creditors — France  and  Holland. 

This  unsatisfactory  condition  of  diplomatic  relations  was 
emphasized  by  the  geographical  bounds  of  the  new  nation. 
On  the  north  was  the  English  province  of  Canada,  posses- 
sion of  which  was  long  the  object  of  the  Continental  Con- 
gress, and  scattered  within  American  territory  were  a  num- 
ber of  fortified  posts  held  and  garrisoned  by  the  British,  in 
direct  contradiction  to  the  terms  of  the  treaty  of  peace. 
To  the  south  were  the  possessions  of  Spain,  for  whom  the 
Americans  had  little  affection  because  of  the  hesitating  and 
half-hearted  assistance  given  during  the  war,  and  because  of 
the  complications  raised  in  the  subsequent  negotiations  for 
the  navigation  rights  of  the  Mississippi.  When  Spain  in 


1 783  obtained  both  Florida  and  Louisiana,  the  Spanish  gov- 
ernment "  aimed  at  excluding  the  United  States,  not  France, 
from  the  gulf,"*  and  she  had  little  compunction  in  showing 
how  little  regard  she  intended  to  have  for  the  wishes  of  the 
new  republic,  whose  very  institutions  implied  a  menace  to 
her  colonial  possessions  in  America.  The  Count  de  Florida 
Blanca,  now  supreme  in  the  conduct  of  the  foreign  relations 
of  Spain,  was  opposed  to  ceding  any  privileges  asked,  much 
less  to  recognizing  any  rights  claimed  by  the  Americans, 
touching  the  Mississippi.  Smarting  under  the  slight  in- 
flicted by  the  treaty  of  1 783,  which  by  a  secret  article  looked 
to  an  English  ownership  of  West  Florida,  she  notified  Con- 
gress that  until  the  question  of  boundaries — always  vexatious 
and  easily  prolonged — had  been  determined,  the  exclusive 
control  of  the  Mississippi  would  be  claimed  by  Spain. f 
As  an  earnest  of  her  desire  to  accommodate  any  difference, 
Don  Diego  de  Gardoqui  was  named  "  Encargado  de  Nego- 
cios,"  to  reside  near  Congress  and  negotiate  a  settlement. 
The  matter  might  have  rested  there  for  some  time  had  it 
not  been  for  the  excitement  raised  in  the  western  country. 
The  arrival  of  Gardoqui  gave  reason  to  look  for  a  removal 
of  differences  and  the  inhabitants  of  the  west  were  quite 
willing  to  await  the  result.  But  months  passed  and  nothing 
was  published.  Jay  was  bound  by  his  instructions  to  insist 
upon  the  right  of  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  from  ocean 
to  source,  while  Gardoqui  sought  to  establish  the  views  of 
his  master  by  securing  the  exclusion  of  all  nations — Ameri- 
cans included — from  that  part  of  the  river  that  ran  through 
his,  then  undefined,  territory.  Annoying  matters  were  con- 

*  Henry  Adams,  History  of  the  United  States,  I,  353. 
f  25  June,  1784. 

2 


10 

tinually  arising  :  the  unlawful  occupation  by  Green  ;  and  his 
followers  of  Spanish  territory,  an  act  promptly  disavowed  by 
Georgia ;  the  stoppage  of  traders  at  Natchez ;  the  question 
of  indebtedness  to  Spain ;  the  complaints  made  by  Indian 
tribes ;  and  what  must  have  been  most  galling  to  Jay,  the 
secret  article  of  the  treaty  with  Great  Britain.  At  length,  in 
August,  1786,  Jay  notified  Congress  that  no  treaty  could  be 
framed  if  the  navigation  right  was  insisted  upon,  and  pro- 
posed to  yield  the  claim  for  a  period  of  twenty-five  or 
thirty  years,  before  the  end  of  which  the  privilege,  he 
thought,  could  hardly  become  of  importance.  * 

To  Madison,  always  firm  in  insisting  on  maintaining  to 
the  utmost  the  claims  against  Spain,  such  a  concession  was 
almost  criminal. 

"  Passing  by  the  other  Southern  States,  figure  to  yourself 
the  effect  of  such  a  stipulation  on  the  Assembly  of  Virginia, 
already  jealous  of  northern  politics,  and  which  will  be  com- 
posed of  about  thirty  members  from  the  western  waters ;  of 
a  majority  of  others  attached  to  the  western  country  from 
interests  of  their  own,  of  their  friends,  or  their  constituents ; 
and  of  many  others  who,  though  indifferent  to  Mississippi, 
will  zealously  play  off  the  disgust  of  their  friends  against 
Federal  measures.  Figure  to  yourself  its  effect  on  the 
people  at  large  on  the  western  waters,  who  are  impatiently 
waiting  for  a  favorable  result  to  the  negotiation  of  Gardoqui, 
and  who  will  consider  themselves  as  sold  by  their  Atlantic 
brethren.  Will  it  be  an  unnatural  consequence  if  they  con- 

*  "  With  respect  to  the  Spaniards,  I  do  not  think  the  navigation  of 
the  Mississippi  is  an  object  of  great  importance  to  us  at  present ;  and 
when  the  banks  of  the  Ohio  and  the  fertile  plains  of  the  western  country 
get  thickly  inhabited,  the  people  will  embrace  the  advantages  which 
nature  affords  them  in  spite  of  all  opposition."  Washington  to  Itoch- 
ambeau,  7  September,  1785. 


II 

sider  themselves  absolved  from  every  Federal  tie,  and  court 
some  protection  for  their  betrayed  rights?  This  protection 
will  appear  more  attainable  from  the  maritime  power  of 
Britain  than  from  any  other  quarter;  and  Britain  will  be 
more  ready  than  any  other  nation  to  seize  an  opportunity  of 
embroiling  our  affairs.  ...  I  should  rather  suppose  that 
he  [the  Spanish  minister]  means  to  work  a  total  separation 
of  interest  and  affection  between  western  and  eastern  set- 
tlements, and  to  foment  the  jealousy  between  eastern  and 
southern  States.  By  the  former,  the  population  of  the 
western  country,  it  may  be  expected,  will  be  checked,  and 
the  Mississippi  so  far  secured ;  and,  by  both,  the  general 
security  of  Spanish  America  be  promoted."* 

This  expression  of  an  extreme  view  was  actually  a  very 
accurate  forecast  of  what  did  occur,  so  far  as  it  applied  to 
the  inhabitants  of  the  western  country.  A  rough  popula- 
tion, having  no  sentimental  ties  that  could  bind  them  to 
home  or  state,  by  necessity  often  trespassers  or  aggressors, 
using  force  to  obtain  what  they  thought  belonged  to  them, 
adventurous  and  restless,  easily  influenced  by  a  desire  for 
gain  that  need  not  respect  the  shadowy  claims  of  a  govern- 
ment incapable  of  enforcing  them,  and  captivated  by  the 
energy  and  promises  of  demagogues,  it  was  not  to  be  ex- 
pected that  they  would  fret  long  under  the  restraints  imposed 
upon  them  by  Spain,  acting  through  her  governors  on  the 
Mississippi.  Retaliation  was  the  readiest  weapon  at  hand. 
Green,  who  had  already  figured  as  the  Governor  of  a  State 
parcelled  out  of  Spanish  territory,  came  again  to  the  front, 
and  another  adventurer,  Clark,  in  return  for  a  seizure  by  the 
Spanish  at  Natchez,  rifled  a  Spanish  trader's  store  at  Vincen- 
nes.  If  the  Americans  were  not  permitted  to  trade  down 

*  Madison  to  Jefferson,  12  August,  1786. 


12 

the  river,  it  was  urged  the  Spaniards  should  not  trade  up. 
And  a  vigorously  expressed  protest  now  appeared  which  did 
much  to  excite  a  public  feeling  against  the  Spaniards,  as  well 
as  against  the  Congress  : 

COPY  OF  A  LETTER  FROM  A  GENTLEMAN  AT  THE  FALLS  OF  OHIO 
TO  HIS  FRIEND  IN  NEW  ENGLAND,  DATED  DECEMBER  4,  1786. 

Dear  Sir :  Politics,  which  a  few  months  ago  were  scarcely 
thought  of,  are  now  sounded  aloud  in  this  part  of  the  world, 
and  discussed  by  almost  every  person.  The  late  commer- 
cial treaty  with  Spain,  in  shutting  up,  as  it  is  said,  the  navi- 
gation of  the  Mississippi  for  the  term  of  twenty-five  years,  • 
has  given  this  western  country  a  universal  shock,  and  struck 
its  inhabitants  with  amazement.  Our  foundation  is  affected  ; 
it  is  therefore  necessary  that  every  individual  exert  himself 
to  apply  a  remedy.  To  sell  and  make  us  vassals  to  the 
merciless  Spaniards  is  a  grievance  not  to  be  borne.  The 
Parliamentary  acts  which  occasioned  our  revolt  from  Great 
Britain  were  not  so  barefaced  and  intolerable.  To  give  us 
the  liberty  of  transporting  our  effects  down  the  river  to  New 
Orleans,  and  then  be  subject  to  the  Spanish  laws  and  impo- 
sitions, is  an  insult  upon  our  understanding.  We  know,  by 
woful  experience,  that  it  is  in  their  power,  when  once  there, 
to  take  our  produce  at  any  price  they  please.  Large  quan- 
tities of  flour,  tobacco,  meal,  &c.,  have  been  taken  there  the 
last  summer,  and  mostly  confiscated  :  those  who  had  per- 
mits from  their  Governor  were  obliged  to  sell  at  a  price  he 
was  pleased  to  state,  or  subject  themselves  to  lose  the  whole. 
Men  of  large  property  are  already  mined  by  their  policy. 
What  benefit  can  you  on  the  Atlantic  shores  receive  from 
this  act?  The  Spaniards,  from  the  amazing  resources  of 
this  river,  can  supply  all  their  own  markets  at  a  much  lower 
price  than  you  possibly  can.  Though  this  country  has  been 
settling  but  about  six  years,  and  that  in  the  midst  of  an  in- 
veterate enemy,  and  most  of  the  first  adventurers  fallen  'a 
prey  to  the  savages,  and  although  the  emigration  to  this 


13 

country  is  so  rapid  that  the  internal  market  is  very  great, 
yet  the  quantity  of  produce  they  now  have  on  hand  is  im- 
mense. Flour  and  pork  are  now  selling  here  at  twelve 
shillings  the  hundred  ;  beef  in  proportion  ;  any  quantities  of 
Indian  corn  can  be  had  at  ninepence  per  bushel.  Three 
times  the  quantity  of  tobacco  and  corn  can  be  raised  on  an 
acre  here  that  can  be  within  the  settlement  on  the  east  side 
of  the  mountains,  and  with  less  cultivation.  It  is,  there- 
fore, rational  to  suppose  that,  in  a  very  few  years,  the  vast 
bodies  of  water  in  those  rivers  will  labor  under  the  immense 
weight  of  the  produce  of  this  rich  and  fertile  country,  and 
Spanish  ships  be  unable  to  convey  it  to  market.  Do  you 
think  to  prevent  the  emigration  from  a  barren  country, 
loaded  with  taxes  and  impoverished  with  debts,  to  the  most 
luxurious  and  fertile  soil  in  the  world  ?  Vain  is  the  thought 
and  presumptuous  the  supposition.  You  may  as  well  en- 
deavor to  prevent  the  fishes  from  gathering  on  a  bank  in 
the  sea  which  affords  them  plenty  of  nourishment.  Shall  the 
best  and  largest  part  of  the  United  States  be  uncultivated,  a 
nest  for  savages  and  beasts  of  prey  ?  Certainly  not.  Prov- 
idence has  designed  it  for  some  nobler  purposes.  This  is 
convincing  to  every  one  who  beholds  the  many  advantages 
and  pleasing  prospects  of  this  country.  Here  is  a  soil 
richer  to  appearance  than  can  possibly  be  made  by  art ; 
large  plains  and  meadows,  without  the  labor  of  hands,  suffi- 
cient to  support  millions  of  cattle  summer  and  winter  ;  cane, 
which  is  also  a  fine  nourishment  for  them,  without  bounds. 
The  spontaneous  production  of  this  country  surpasses  your 
imagination ;  consequently  I  see  nothing  to  prevent  our 
herds  being  as  numerous  here,  in  time,  as  they  are  in  the 
Kingdom  of  Mexico.  Our  lands  to  the  northward  of  Ohio, 
for  the  produce  of  wheat,  &c.,  will,  I  think,  vie  with  the 
Island  of  Sicily.  Shall  all  this  country  now  be  cultivated 
entirely  for  the  use  of  the  Spaniards?  Shall  we  be  their 
bondmen,  as  the  children  of  Israel  were  to  the  Egyptians  ? 
Shall  one  part  of  the  United  States  be  slaves  while  the  other 
is  free  ?  Human  nature  shudders  at  the  thought,  and  free- 


men  will  despise  those  who  could  be  so  mean  as  to  even 
contemplate  on  so  vile  a  subject. 

Our  situation  is  as  bad  as  it  possibly  can  be ;  therefore, 
every  exertion  to  retrieve  our  circumstances  must  be  manly, 
eligible,  and  just. 

We  can  raise  twenty  thousand  troops  this  side  the  Alle- 
ghany  and  Appalachian  mountains  ;  and  the  annual  increase 
of  them  by  emigration  from  other  parts  is  from  two  to  four 
thousand. 

We  have  taken  all  the  goods  belonging  to  the  Spanish 
merchants  of  post  Vincennes  and  the  Illinois,  and  are  de- 
termined they  shall  not  trade  up  the  river,  provided  they 
will  not  let  us  trade  down  it.  Preparations  are  now  making 
here  (if  necessary)  to  drive  the  Spaniards  from  their  settle- 
ments at  the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi.  In  case  we  are  not 
countenanced  and  succored  by  the  United  States,  (if  we 
need  it,)  our  allegiance  will  be  thrown  off,  and  some  other 
Power  applied  to.  Great  Britain  stands  ready  with  open 
arms  to  receive  and  support  us  ;  they  have  already  offered 
to  open  their  resources  for  our  supplies.  When  once  re- 
united to  them,  "farewell,  a  long  farewell,  to  all  your 
boasted  greatness ;"  the  province  of  Canada  and  the  inhabi- 
tants of  these  waters,  of  themselves,  in  time,  will  be  able  to 
conquer  you.  You  are  as  ignorant  of  this  country  as  Great 
Britain  was  of  America.  These  hints,  if  rightly  improved, 
may  be  of  some  service ;  if  not,  blame  yourselves  for  the 
neglect. 

The  anti-federal  sentiments  shown  in  such  expressions  of 
opinion  naturally  disturbed  Madison,  and  he  returned  to 
the  Continental  Congress  with  the  intention  of  forcing  the 
question  of  the  Mississippi,  now  by  a  legislative  trick,  as  he 
thought,  left  almost  entirely  in  the  hands  of  Jay.  He  was 
supported  in  this  by  the  strong  feeling  of  the  Virginia  Leg- 
islature, asserting  in  unmistakable  language  the  importance 
of  acquiring  the  right  of  navigating  the  river.  But  he  was 


15 

opposed  by  the  indifference,  or  rather  the  interest,  of  the 
Eastern  and  some  of  the  Middle  States.  To  them,  the 
navigation  of  the  western  river  meant  nothing  ;  for  they  were 
more  intent  upon  acquiring  commercial  privileges  in  the 
Spanish  West  Indies,  and  were  willing,  almost  eager,  to  se- 
cure these  at  the  expense  of  the  claims  applying  to  the  Mis- 
sissippi. It  was  on  the  vote  of  the  four  Eastern  States,  with 
the  assistance  of  New  York,  New  Jersey  and  Pennsylvania, 
that  the  restriction  imposed  upon  Jay  in  his  negotiations,  of 
insisting  upon  this  right,  had  been  repealed ;  and  this  vote 
was  based  upon  such  motives  as  were  not  likely  to  be 
changed.  For  New  York  saw  in  the  west  a  rival  to  her 
commercial  interests,  and  Pennsylvania,  if  not  controlled, 
was  at  least  influenced,  by  the  same  jealousy.  In  1786  the 
feeling  was  so  strong  as  to  produce  a  talk  of  separation  of 
the  Middle  and  Eastern  States  from  the  Southern,  should  a 
determination  of  the  matter  be  forced,  and  conclude  to  the 
injury  of  the  wishes  of  the  former.  *  Yet,  as  Madison  said, 
would  the  Eastern  States  have  remained  quiet  under  a  ces- 
sion by  Congress  of  the  fishery  rights  for  commercial  privi- 
leges applying  to  tobacco  ?  To  yield  the  navigation  rights 
in  exchange  for  liberty  to  export  fish  and  flour  into  the 
Spanish  colonies  involved,  in  his  view,  as  great  a  sectional 
sacrifice,  the  South  and  West  being  sacrificed  to  the  North,  f 

*  Monroe  to  Madison,  3  September,    1786. 

\  Early  in  his  negotiations,  Gardoqui  had  said  that  as  the  Spanish 
King  "has  no  occasion  for  the  codfish,  oil,  salmon,  grain,  flour,  rice, 
nor  other  productions,  he  may,  considering  the  right  which  obliges  his 
subjects  to  provide  themselves  by  their  own  industry  or  other  useful  and 
important  means,  find  it  convenient  to  prohibit  them,  to  remind  this 
nation  \t.  e.  the  United  States]  at  present,  as  a  friend,  that  they  have 
no  treaty."  Gardoqui  to  Jay,  25  May,  1786. 


i6 

The  threatening  situation  in  the  West,  however,  did  pro- 
duce a  change  of  sentiment.  New  Jersey  instructed  her 
delegates  in  Congress  to  labor  for  the  navigation,  while  a 
change  in  the  Pennsylvania  representation  gave  her  vote  to 
the  South.  Rhode  Island,  believing  an  extensive  land  spec- 
ulation was  under  the  apparent  indifference  of  her  New 
England  sister  States,  added  her  influence  to  the  same  side. 
Gorham  of  Massachusetts  bluntly  expressed  the  selfishness 
of  the  East  by  avowing  his  wish  to  close  the  Mississippi,  that 
the  inducements  to  move  into  the  western  country  might  be 
lessened,  and  the  drain  on  the  population  and  wealth  of  the 
Atlantic  States  thereby  decreased.  In  spite  of  this,  the 
Spanish  agent  gained  the  impression  that  the  general  drift 
of  American  policy  was  opposed  to  insisting  on  the  right, 
and  he  urged  this  upon  his  court.  *  Here  the  matter  rested, 
for  the  institution  of  a  new  government  took  it  out  of  the 
hands  of  the  confederation,  and  gave  it,  with  a  legacy  of 
other  undetermined  questions,  to  the  newly  formed  admin- 
istration of  President  Washington. 

In  the  Washington  Papers  are  full  summaries  in  the 
President's  writing  of  the  correspondence  between  Jay  and 
Gardoqui,  but  without  note  or  comment.  Nor  is  there  to 
be  found  any  note  or  memorandum  to  show  whether  there 
was  any  special  incident  in  the  west,  or  on  the  Mississippi, 
or  in  Spain,  that  should  have  brought  this  question  before 

*"  It  appears  to  me  now,  as  it  has  long  done,  that  they  think  here  a 
free  port  on  the  Mississippi  will  satisfy  the  wishes  of  the  Americans, 
and  on  that  idea  ground  their  expectation?  that  the  instructions  sent  in 
autumn  last  to  Mr.  Gardoqui  will  enable  that  gentleman  to  bring  the 
negotiations  to  a  speedy  termination."  Carmichael  to  Jay,  29  April, 


17 

the  Cabinet.  In  August,  1790,  the  matter  was  taken  up, 
and  the  various  steps  taken  are  detailed  in  the  following 
pages. 

The  instruments  at  hand  for  conducting  a  negotiation 
were  few  and  imperfect.  Gardoqui  had  returned  to  Spain, 
leaving  his  secretary  Jose  Ignacio  de  Viar,  in  charge,  while 
Carmichael,  as  merely  charge  at  the  Court  of  Madrid, 
found  it  difficult  to  secure  access  to  Florida  Blanca,  and 
was  compelled  to  depend  more  upon  a  certain  "  back-door  " 
influence  than  upon  his  own  activity.  The  United  States 
had  no  diplomatic  representative  in  England,  but  Gouverneur 
Morris  was  there  in  an  unofficial  capacity,  seeking  to  pave 
the  way  for  a  settlement  of  differences  and  an  exchange  of 
ministers.  Jefferson,  whose  long  service  abroad  would  have 
rendered  his  assistance  valuable  in  a  negotiation,  was  the 
Secretary  of  State,  and  forced  to  depend  upon  such  agents 
as  the  infant  diplomatic  system  of  the  government  were  sup- 
plied with.  In  Portugal,  closely  connected  with  Spain  in 
everything  but  policy,  there  was  no  American  representative, 
and  in  France  there  was  nothing  higher  than  a  charge 
c?  affaires.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Netherlands  was  the 
only  European  power  that  had  a  minister  resident  regularly 
accredited  to  the  United  States,  and  France  was  the  only 
power  that  could  supply  a  means  of  diplomatic  communica- 
tion so  high  as  a  charge  d'  affaires — Otto.  While  the 
European  courts  were  fully  cognizant  of  every  step  taken  by 
the  American  agents  in  Europe,  and  had  an  almost  imme- 
diate knowledge  of  all  that  they  proposed,  Jefferson  acted 
on  imperfect  knowledge,  gained  often  from  doubtful  sources, 
and  secured  long  after  the  events  described  had  happened, 


18 

when  new  combinations  might  have  produced  new  situa- 
tions. Six  weeks  were  required  for  the  passage  of  a  letter 
from  London  to  New  York,  nine  weeks  were  a  fair  run 
from  Paris,  and  sometimes  nineteen  weeks  elapsed  between 
the  delivery  of  a  letter  by  a  charge  and  its  receipt  by  Jeffer- 
son. Nor  was  this  the  only  drawback,  for  it  was  reasonably 
certain  that  before  Carmichael's  letters  could  leave  Spain,  or 
Jefferson's  be  delivered  to  him,  the  Spanish  court  had  read 
them  and  were  perfectly  cognizant  of  what  they  contained. 
Even  the  cypher  used  between  these  two  was  known  to  it. 
A  new  danger  to  the  United  States  appeared  in  the  pros- 
pect of  war  between  Spain  and  Great  Britain,  in  the  event 
of  which  a  contest  between  the  two  powers  in  America  was 
most  probable,  as  the  weakness  of  the  Spanish  colonies 
offered  a  tempting  prize  to  the  power  of  a  nation  almost 
supreme  on  the  ocean.  The  Spaniards  had  laid  claim  to 
nearly  the  whole  of  the  western  coast  of  America,  from 
Cape  Horn  to  the  sixtieth  degree  of  north  latitude,  and  had 
watched  with  a  feeling  of  jealousy,  aggravated  by  a  sense  of 
injury,  the  establishment  of  a  British  settlement  in  Nootka 
Sound,  on  Vancouver's  Island.  This  inlet  of  the  sea  had 
been  first  explored  by  Captain  Cook  in  one  of  his  voyages, 
and,  on  the  establishment  of  the  English  in  India,  became 
a  trading  station,  colonized  by  the  English  and  recognized 
by  grants  of  land  from  the  natives.  After  three  years  of 
undisturbed  possession,  the  little  settlement  was  surprised 
by  the  arrival  of  two  Spanish  ships  of  war  from  Mexico, 
which  seized  an  English  merchant  vessel — the  Iphigenia — 
imprisoned  her  crew,  looted  the  vessel,  and  pulling  down 
the  British  flag  on  the  settlement,  raised  that  of  Spain,  and 
subsequently  treated  all  comers  as  intruders. 


1 9 

Spain,  while  recognizing  that  she  had  committed  an  ag- 
gravated insult  upon  the  English  flag,  was  at  first  inclined  to 
to  assume  a  high  position,  demanding  that  British  subjects 
should  in  the  future  refrain  from  trespassing  on  Spanish  ter- 
ritory;  but,  in  consideration  of  the  "ignorance"  of  those 
who  had  landed  at  Nootka,  the  seized  vessels  were  released. 
Such  a  message  was  little  suited  to  the  disposition  of  Pitt  or 
of  the  English  people,  and  in  default  of  further  reparation 
from  Spain,  war  must  ensue,  for  which  extensive  prepara- 
tions were  made  on  both  sides. 

The  Spanish  were  collecting  their  fleets  at  Cadiz  and 
Ferrol,  and  the  king  on  May  5,  1790,  announced  to  Par- 
liament the  prospect  of  war.  A  credit  was  given,  but  little 
opposition  appeared  ;  and  while  a  peaceable  settlement  was 
sought  by  sending  a  negotiator — Mr.  Alleyne  Fitzherbert  * 
— to  Madrid,  with  instructions  to  insist  on  a  full  reparation 
to  the  injured,  before  consenting  even  to  a  discussion  of  the 
abstract  rights  involved,  the  collection  of  an  army,  fleets  and 
munitions  of  war  was  actively  pushed,  and  plans  formed  for 
attacking  Spain  in  the  West  Indies  and  South  America. 

The  news  of  the  King's  message  reached  the  United  States 
in  June,  and  was,  as  Jefferson  termed  it,  "interesting  news." 
The  aggressiveness  of  Great  Britain  was  acknowledged. 
"You  will  see  by  the  papers  enclosed  that  Great  Britain  is 
itching  for  war.  I  do  not  see  how  one  can  be  avoided,  un- 
less Spain  should  be  frightened  into  concessions.  The  con- 

*  Fitzherbert  had  been  sent  to  Paris  in  1782  to  negotiate  the  treaty  of 
peace  between  Great  Britain  and  France  and  Spain ;  and  it  was  for  his 
services  in  bringing  to  a  successful  end  the  negotiations  with  Spain  on 
the  Nootka  question,  that  he  was  raised  to  the  Irish  peerage  as  Baron 
St.  Helen's. 


2O 

sequences  of  such  an  event  must  have  an  important  rela- 
tion to  the  affairs  of  the  United  States."  *  "  It  was  evident 
they  [the  British  Houses  of  Parliament]  would  accept 
nothing  short  of  an  extensive  renunciation  from  Spain  as  to 
her  American  pretensions.  Perhaps  she  is  determined  to 
be  satisfied  with  nothing  but  war,  dismemberment  of  the 
Spanish  empire,  and  annihilation  of  her  fleet.  Nor  does 
her  countenance  towards  us  clear  up  at  all."  f  But  there 
might  be  a  compensation  to  America.  "  If  the  war  between 
France  and  Spain  takes  place,  I  think  France  will  inevit- 
ably be  involved  in  it.  In  that  case,  I  hope  the  new  world 
will  fatten  on  the  follies  of  the  old.  If  we  can  but  establish 
the  armed  neutrality  for  ourselves,  we  must  become  the 
carriers  for  all  parties  as  far  as  we  can  raise  vessels."  J 
Washington,  just  recovered  from  an  illness  that  had  almost 
proved  fatal,  made  the  first  mention  of  the  possibility  of 
the  Floridas  being  involved  in  the  threatened  war,  but  in- 
sisted on  the  policy  of  neutrality.  "  It  seems  to  be  our 
policy  to  keep  in  the  situation  in  which  nature  has  placed 
us,  to  observe  a  strict  neutrality,  and  to  furnish  others  with 
those  good  things  of  subsistence  which  they  may  want,  and 
which  our  fertile  land  abundantly  produces,  if  circumstances 
and  events  will  permit  us  to  do  so.  .  .* .  Gradually  recover- 
ing from  the  distresses  in  which  the  war  left  us,  patiently 
advancing  in  our  task  of  civil  government,  unentangled  in 
the  crooked  politics  of  Europe,  wanting  scarcely  anything 
but  the  full  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  (which  we  must 

*  Madison  to  Pendleton,  22  June,  1790. 
t  Jefferson  to  Monroe,  20  June,  1790. 
\Jefferson  to  E.  Rutledge,  4  July,  1790. 


21 

have,  and  as  certainly  shall  have  as  we  remain  a  nation), 
I  have  supposed,  that,  with  the  undeviating  exercise  of  a 
just,  steady  and  prudent  national  policy,  we  shall  be  the 
gainers,  whether  the  powers  of  the  old  world  may  be  in 
peace  or  war,  but  more  especially  in  the  latter  case.  In 
that  case  our  importance  will  certainly  increase,  and  our 
friendship  be  courted.  Our  dispositions  will  not  be  indif- 
ferent to  Britain  or  Spain.  Why  will  not  Spain  be  wise  and 
liberal  at  once  ?  It  would  be  easy  to  annihilate  all  causes 
of  quarrels  between  that  nation  and  the  United  States  at  this 
time.  At  a  future  period,  that  may  be  far  from  being  a  fact. 
Should  a  war  take  place  between  Great  Britain  and  Spain,  I 
conceive,  from  a  great  variety  of  concurring  circumstances, 
there  is  the  highest  probability  that  the  Floridas  will  soon  be 
in  the  possession  of  the  former."* 

In  these  phrases  were  compressed  the  policy  of  the  gov- 
ernment :  neutrality,  if  possible,  and  an  attempt  to  make 
the  difference  between  the  European  powers  a  means  of 
obtaining  concessions  from  Spain  long  sought  for.  "The 
part  we  are  to  act,"  wrote  Jefferson  to  Carmichael,  "is  un- 
certain, and  will  be  difficult.  The  unsettled  state  of  our  dis- 
pute with  Spain,  may  give  a  turn  to  it  very  different  from 
what  we  would  wish," — and  Col.  David  Humphreys  was  sent 
to  Madrid  to  aid  Carmichael,  bearing  a  sketch  of  general 
matters  to  be  considered  in  the  negotiation,  drawn  up  by 
Jefferson,  f  In  introducing  Humphreys  to  Carmichael, 
Jefferson  wrote  : — 

"  With  this  information,  written  and  oral,  you  will  be  en- 

*  Washington  to  Lafayette,  II  August,  1790. 
f  Post. 


22 

abled  to  meet  the  minister  in  conversations  on  the  subject 
of  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi,  to  which  we  wish  you 
to  lead  his  attention  immediately.  Impress  him  thoroughly 
with  the  necessity  of  an  early  and  even  an  immediate  settle- 
ment of  this  matter,  and  of  a  return  to  the  field  of  negotia- 
tion for  this  purpose  ;  and  though  it  must  be  done  delicately, 
yet  he  must  be  made  to  understand  unequivocally,  that  a 
resumption  of  the  negotiation  is  not  desired  on  our  part, 
unless  he  can  determine,  in  the  first  opening  of  it,  to  yield 
the  immediate  and  full  enjoyment  of  that  navigation.  .  .  . 
It  is  impossible  to  answer  for  the  forbearance  of  our  western 
citizens.  We  endeavor  to  quiet  them  with  the  expectation 
of  an  attainment  of  their  rights  by  peaceable  means.  But 
should  they,  in  a  moment  of  impatience,  hazard  others, 
there  is  no  saying  how  far  we  may  be  led ;  for  neither  them- 
selves nor  their  rights  will  ever  be  abandoned  by  us. 

"You  will  be  pleased  to  observe,  that  we  press  these  mat- 
ters warmly  and  firmly,  under  this  idea,  that  the  war  be- 
tween Spain  and  Great  Britian  will  be  begun  before  you  re- 
ceive this ;  and  such  a  moment  must  not  be  lost.  But  should 
an  accommodation  take  place,  we  retain,  indeed,  the  same 
object  and  the  same  resolutions  unalterably  ;  but  your  discre- 
tion will  suggest,  that  in  that  event  they  must  be  pressed 
more  softly,  and  that  patience  and  persuasion  must  temper 
your  conferences,  till  either  these  may  prevail,  or  some 
other  circumstance  turn  up,  which  may  enable  us  to  use 
other  means  for  the  attainment  of  an  object  which  we  are 
determined,  in  the  end,  to  obtain  at  every  risk."  * 

In  the  event  of  war  the  good  offices  of  France,  to  assist  in 
the  negotiations  at  Madrid,  were  to  be  asked.  | 

In  his  rough  draft  of  "Heads  of  Consideration  "  for  Mr. 
Carmichael,  drawn  up  by  Jefferson  2  August,  1 790,  the  pos- 
sibility of  a  necessary  coalition  with  Great  Britain  against 

*  Jefferson  to  Carmichael,  2  August,  1790. 
\Jeffersonto  William  Short,  IO  August,  1790. 


23 

Spain  was  considered.  The  inhabitants  of  the  western 
country  required  a  vent  for  their  surplus  products,  and  the 
natural  vent  was  down  the  Mississippi.  To  deny  the  privi- 
lege of  navigating  that  river  to  the  mouth  to  the  Americans, 
was  to  invite  a  complication  not  easily  to  be  solved.  Either 
the  federal  government  must  take  up  the  cause  of  the 
western  people  and  by  force  or  negotiation  obtain  conces- 
sions from  Spain ;  or  it  must  reduce  the  Kentuckians  to  an 
acquiescence  in  the  arbitrary  decrees  of  Spain ;  or  it  must 
consent  to  a  separation  of  the  western  territory.  To  aban- 
don the  west  or  reduce  it  to  obedience  was  equally  imprac- 
ticable, and  it  remained  only  to  obtain  concesssions.  If  by 
force,  the  United  States  could  act  alone  or  in  conjunction 
with  Great  Britain  "with  a  view  to  partition,"  and  in  the 
latter  case  Jefferson  noted  : 

"The  Floridas  (includ?  N.  Orleans)  would  be  assigned 
to  us.  Louisiana  (or  all  the  country  on  the  west?  waters  of 
y*  Missi.)  to  them.  We  confess  that  such  an  alliance  is 
not  what  we  would  wish,  because  it  may  eventually  lead  us 
into  embarrassing  situations  as  to  our  best  friend,  and  put 
the  power  of  two  n'bors  into  ye  hands  of  one.  L1?  Lans- 
downe  has  declared  he  gave  the  Floridas  to  Spain  rather 
than  to  the  U.  S.,  as  a  bone  of  discord  with  the  H.  of  Bour- 
bon, and  of  reunion  with  Gr.  Br.  Connolly's  attempt  (as 
well  as  other  facts)  prove  they  keep  it  in  view."  * 

The  English  and  Spanish  negotiations  were  continued 
through  the  summer.  On  June  4th  the  Spanish  ministry 
declared  that  the  release  of  the  vessels  had  been  a  sufficient 
reparation  for  actual  injury,  and  there  only  remained  the 

*This  document  is  printed  in  full  post. 


24 

question  of  right  to  be  determined,  a  question  that  the  in- 
structions to  Fitzherbert  prevented  him  from  discussing 
under  such  a  declaration.  The  English  demanded  a  res- 
toration of  the  vessels,  a  full  indemnity  for  the  seizure,  and 
a  reparation  for  the  insult  committed  on  the  English  flag. 
Count  de  Florida  Blanca  replied  that  he  would  grant  the 
satisfaction  demanded,  on  condition  that  the  damages  were 
determined  by  an  impartial  judge,  and  that  all  the  rights  of 
Spain  should  be  positively  reserved.  (June  18.)  England 
continued  her  preparations  and  called  upon  Holland  to  assist 
her,  as  she  was  bound  to  by  treaty.  In  response  a  Dutch 
fleet  joined  Admiral  Howe  at  Portsmouth,  and  as  a  counter- 
movement  Spain  collected  a  fleet  at  Cadiz. 

Nor  did  Spain  stand  alone  in  the  matter,  for  by  the 
pacte  defamille  France  was  bound  to  give  her  assistance  in 
an  offensive  or  defensive  war,  and  notice  that  such  aid 
might  become  necessary  was  served  upon  the  French  min- 
istry. Coming  as  it  did,  when  France  was  in  the  throes  of 
revolution,  it  naturally  produced  some  difference  of  opinion, 
with  which  questions  of  constitutional  policy  were  com- 
mingled. A  few  months  before,  Mirabeau  had  induced  the 
Assembly  to  decide  that  while  the  right  of  peace  and  war 
belonged  to  the  nation,  war  could  be  declared  only  by  a 
decree  of  the  Assembly  based  upon  a  formal  and  pressing 
(necessaire)  proposal  of  the  king,  and  approved  by  him. 
The  legislature,  by  controlling  the  supplies,  could  at  any 
time,  even  in  the  progress  of  a  war,  impose  the  necessity  of 
making  peace  upon  the  king.  Such  a  decision  need  not 
have  proved  embarrassing  had  not  the  country  been  bound 
to  perform  certain  acts,  under  certain  contingencies,  and 
apparently  without  the  power  of  questioning  their  justice  or 


25 

expediency.  The  "Society  of  1789,"  where,  as  in  the 
"  Club  des  Jacobins,"  questions  of  public  policy  were  dis- 
cussed before  being  submitted  to  the  Assembly,  declared 
that  it  was  impossible  to  maintain  the  "family  compact" 
under  the  existing  constitution.  "  They  say  that  they  cannot 
adhere  to  engagements  which  never  were  just,  which  are 
incompatible  with  the  rights  of  man  and  the  principles  of  a 
free  constitution,  and  which  render  the  nation  dependent 
upon  the  will  of  one  man,  and  that  man  a  stranger.  They 
declare  such  treaties  between  kings  to  be  conspiracies 
against  the  people  of  their  respective  countries."  * 

.  So  distinctly  colored  as  was  this  declaration  with  the 
temper  of  the  time  as  to  be  almost  grotesque,  Mirabeau 
was  too  shrewd  a  politician  not  to  recognize  that  it  repre- 
sented such  a  share  of  public  opinion  that  it  could  not 
wisely  be  ignored.  He  knew  the  advantage  of  preserving 
the  Spanish  alliance,  yet  that  alliance  must  be  modified  to 
make  it  conform  better  with  the  prevalent  ideas  of  the  uni- 
versal brotherhood  of  man,  and  also  to  render  it  palatable 
to  those  who  looked  upon  it  as  an  instrument  of  monarchy 
— a  euphemism  for  tyranny.  Besides,  France  herself  had 
important  colonial  interests  in  the  West  Indies,  whose  safety 
would  be  jeopardized  by  a  rupture  of  peace  with  Great 
Britain.  Spain  had  served  notice  that  she  would  look  else- 
where for  alliances,  should  France  fail  her,  and  demanded 
an  immediate  state  of  the  conduct  the  ministers  intended  to 
pursue.  It  was  Mirabeau  who  drew  up  the  report  express- 
ing the  opinion  of  the  Comite  Diplomatique  on  the  com- 
pact, and  who  laid  it  before  the  Assembly  on  the  25 th  of 
August.  Earl  Gower  wrote  of  it : — 

*  Dispatches  of  Earl  Gower,  9  July,  1790. 


26 

"  It  consisted  in  advising  the  Assembly  to  empower  them 
to  examine  that  treaty  in  order  to  form  out  of  it  a  national 
compact,  by  leaving  out  all  the  articles  offensive,  and  at  the 
same  time  to  request  the  king  to  order  his  minister  at  the 
Court  of  Madrid  to  enter  into  a  negotiation  with  the  Spanish 
ministry  upon  those  grounds.  They  proposed  two  decrees  : 

"  i st.  That  all  existing  treaties  shall  be  maintained  by  the 
French  nation  until  it  shall  have  revised  and  modified  them. 

"  and.  That,  before  the  thorough  examination  of  treaties 
which  the  nation  may  think  proper  to  continue  or  alter,  the 
king  shall  be  requested  to  make  known  to  all  the  powers 
with  which  France  is  connected  that  justice  and  the  love  of 
peace  are  the  bases  of  the  French  constitution ;  that  the 
nation  cannot  admit  in  her  treaties  any  stipulations  which 
are  not  purely  defensive  and  commercial.  That  accordingly 
they  request  the  king  to  inform  his  Catholic  Majesty  that 
the  French  nation,  in  taking  all  proper  measures  to  maintain 
peace,  will  abide  by  the  engagements  which  her  government 
has  contracted  with  Spain.  That  they  also  desire  the  king 
to  order  his  ministers  to  negotiate  accordingly  with  the 
Court  of  Spain,  and  to  commission  thirty  ships  of  the  line, 
eight  of  which  at  least  to  be  fitted  out  in  the  ports  of  the 
Mediterranean. 

"This  report  was  taken  into  consideration  yesterday 
morning,  and,  after  a  short  debate,  the  Assembly  decreed 
that  they  would  abide  by  the  defensive  and  commercial 
engagements  which  the  government  has  contracted  with 
Spain ;  that  the  king  should  be  desired  to  order  his  ambas- 
sadors to  negotiate  with  the  ministers  of  the  Catholic  king 
in  order  to  strengthen,  by  a  national  treaty,  tyes  useful  to 
both  people,  and  to  fix  with  precision  and  clearness  all  stip- 
ulations which  may  not  be  entirely  conformable  to  the  views 
of  general  peace  and  to  the  principles  of  justice,  which 
shall  always  be  the  politics  of  the  French ;  and  also,  taking 
into  consideration  the  armaments  of  the  different  nations  of 
Europe,  their  progressive  increase,  the  security  of  the 
French  colonies  and  commerce,  they  decreed  that  the  king 


27 

shall  be  desired  to  order  into  commission  forty-five  ships  of 
the  line,  with  a  proportionable  number  of  frigates  and  small 
vessels." 

These  acts,  a  curious  mixture  of  politics  and  sentiment, 
were  what  appeared  on  the  surface,  and  while  seeking  to 
retain  the  expectancy  of  Spain  for  aid  by  a  vote  for  ships, 
delay  was  also  the  object.  Nor  was  this  all.  The  prepara- 
tions of  England  on  so  large  a  scale,  to  secure  what  was 
regarded  as  a  very  disproportionate  end,  could  not  but 
arouse  the  suspicions  of  the  continental  nations  that  some 
other  object  was  to  be  attained.  Late  in  July  the  Journal 
des  Debats  et  Decrets  said  :  "  II  est  impossible  aussi  que  ces 
armemens  regard  1'  Espagne  seule.  II  est  bien  probable 
qu'elles  menacent  egalement  les  possessions  Francoises."* 
Such  a  view  was  promptly  disavowed  by  the  French  minis- 
try ;  but  England  knew  the  terms  of  the  family  compact,  and 
could  not  fail  to  be  irritated  by  the  vote  of  the  Assembly 
to  increase  the  navy,  though  assured  by  M.  Montmorin  that 
the  increase  would  be  very  gradual,  and  by  both  M.  Mont- 
morin and  M.  Neckar  of  the  desire  of  France  for  peace. 
Earl  Gower  was  instructed  to  notify  the  French  ministry 
that  "  any  assistance  offered  to  Spain  will  oblige  the  British 
Cabinet  to  adopt  such  measures  as  may  be  most  likely  to 
render  that  assistance  ineffectual ;"  and  to  still  further  sup- 
port England's  position,  Hugh  Elliott  was  sent  on  a  secret 
mission  to  France.  It  is  to  Mr.  Oscar  Browning  that  our 
knowledge  of  his  mission  is  due,  and  we  quote  his  note  : — 

*  Even  in  England  the  good  faith  of  the  ministry  in  asking  for  a 
credit  to  arm  against  Spain  was  questioned,  for  there  had  already  ex- 
isted a  belief  that  an  expedition  to  the  Baltic  was  on  foot. 


28 

"  Pitt  was  using  the  strongest  and  most  haughty  language 
to  compel  Spain  to  submit  to  us,  but  if  France  joined  her 
these  remonstrances  would  be  ineffectual,  and  a  European 
war  would  break  out.  Mirabeau  was  not  a  minister,  and 
therefore  Lord  Gower  could  have  no  communication  with 
him,  but  he  was  chairman  of  the  comite  diplomatique  of  the 
National  Assembly,  in  whose  hands,  rather  than  in  those  of 
the  minister,  lay  the  issues  of  peace  and  war.  It  was  import- 
ant to  secure  that  Mirabeau  should  not  only  maintain  the 
principle  that  France  was  not  bound  to  assist  Spain  under 
the  present  circumstances,  but  should  do  all  he  could  to 
urge  Spain  to  submit  to  the  demands  of  England.  If 
Elliott  was  authorized  to  use  any  other  arguments  to  Mira- 
beau of  a  more  delicate  or  secret  nature,  it  would  be  a 
reason  for  the  correspondence  having  completely  disap- 
peared." 

Whatever  were  the  arguments  used,  they  were  so  effective 
that  the  popular  party  signified  to  Lord  Gower  "their 
earnest  desire  to  use  their  influence  with  the  Court  of  Mad- 
rid in  order  to  bring  it  to  accede  to  the  just  demands  of  his 
Majesty,  and,  if  supported  by  us,  I  am  induced  to  believe 
they  will  readily  prefer  an  English  alliance  to  a  Spanish 
compact."  * 

Count  de  Florida  Blanca  in  the  meantime  was  losing 
heart.  His  efforts  to  secure  the  aid  of  France  had  resulted 
in  an  apparent  acquiescence,  it  is  true,  but  the  widespread 
disaffection  and  mutiny  in  the  French  fleet  and  army  would 
make  the  aid  an  element  of  danger  rather  than  of  strength. 
He  had  coquetted  with  the  United  States  by  throwing  out  a 
hint  that  the  right  to  navigate  the  Mississippi  might  be  con- 
ceded, f — this  to  prevent  the  possible  alliance  between  the 

*  Cower" s  Despatches,  22  October,  1790. 

fOn  September  2ist,  Hamilton  wrote  to  Washington  speaking  of  a 


29 

United  States  and  Great  Britain.  His  own  position  was 
precarious,  and  to  serve  as  a  figure-head  for  executing  the 
policy  of  another  and  irresponsible  person,  was  not  kind  to 
his  temper.  He  thought  it  best  to  yield.  "Je  me  rends  a 
vos  conditions,"  he  said  to  Fitzhebert,  "  non  parce  qu'elles 
sont  justes,  mais  parce  que  j'y  suis  force.  Si  la  France 
nous  avait  aide,  je  ne  m'y  serais  jamais  soumis,  mais  nous 
ne  pouvons  tout  seuls  nous  mesures  avec  nous.  Faites  done 
ce  que  vous  voulez."  On  the  28th  October  the  convention 
was  signed,  "by  which  it  was  agreed  that  the  lands  and 
buildings  of  which  British  subjects  had  been  dispossessed  in 
North  America  should  be  restored  to  them ;  that  British 
subjects  should  not  be  disturbed  or  molested  in  carrying  on 
their  fisheries  in  the  South  Seas,  or  in  making  settlements 
for  the  purpose  of  commerce  on  the  coasts  of  those  seas  in 
places  not  already  occupied  ;  and  that  on  the  other  hand  the 

letter  from  Daniel  Parker,  dated  London,  the  I2th  of  July,  which  men- 
tioned that  "  he  had  just  seen  M.  de  Miranda,  who  had  recently  con- 
versed with  the  Marquis  del  Campo,  from  whom  he  learned  that  the 
Court  of  Spain  had  acceded  to  our  right  of  navigating  the  Mississippi. 
Col.  Smith  has  also  read  to  me  a  passage  out  of  another  letter  of  the  6lh 
of  July,  which  mentions  that  orders  had  been  sent  to  the  Viceroy  of 
Mexico  and  the  Governor  of  New  Orleans  not  to  interrupt  the  passage 
of  vessels  of  the  United  States  through  that  river." 

On  September  22d  Lear,  in  a  letter  to  the  President,  announced  it  a 
based  on   "  pretty   direct  information,"   and   the  letter  of  Gouverneu 
Morris  dated  2  July,  reporting  that  the  concession  was  "matter  of  com- 
mon report,"  must  have  been  in  the  President's  hands  for  some  time 
Further  than  this,  Lear  in  New  York  and  King  in  Boston  claimed  to 
have  authentic  information  of  a  full   accommodation  between  Grea 
Britain  and  Spain — a  premature  conclusion,  based  upon  mere  rumors. 
See  also  Humphreys'  letter,  post. 


30 

king  of  Britain  should  engage  to  take  the  most  effectual 
measures  that  these  fisheries  should  not  be  made  a  pretext 
for  illicit  trade  with  the  Spanish  settlements ;  and  with  that 
view  it  was  further  stipulated  that  British  subjects  should 
not  carry  on  their  fisheries  within  ten  leagues  from  any  part 
of  the  coast  already  occupied  by  Spain."* 

This  convention  was  used  by  the  United  States  as  a  pre- 
cedent when  urging  its  claims  in  the  Oregon  question. 

Congress  adjourned  on  August  i2th,  and  on  the  i5th  the 
President,  accompanied  by  Jefferson,  started  on  a  journey 
to  Rhode  Island  which  occupied  about  ten  days.  On  their 
return  to  New  York  the  President  addressed  a  series  of 
questions  to  the  Vice- President,  the  Chief  Justice  and  the 
three  members  of  his  Cabinet,  on  the  position  to  be  taken 
should  Lord  Dorchester,  f  the  Governor  of  Quebec,  wish  to 
strike  the  Spanish  colonies  by  sending  troops  from  Detroit, 
through  the  territory  of  the  United  States.  It  is  the  replies 
to  these  questions  that  are  printed  in  the  following  pages, 
and  constitute  the  first  discussion  in  diplomacy  by  Washing- 
ton's advisers  that  we  have  a  record  of.  The  documents 
speak  for  themselves,  and  the  subsequent  events  may  now 
be  described.  Although  such  an  application  was  never 
formally  made,  the  replies  have  an  interest  when  brought 
into  comparison  with  Jefferson's  negotiations  with  France 
and  Spain  during  his  presidency,  which  led  up  to  the  pur- 
chase of  Louisiana. 

*  Stanhope,  Life  of  Pitt,  II,  62.  The  convention  determining  the 
indemnity  was  made  in  February,  1793,  and  the  port  at  Nootka  was 
not  evacuated  by  the  Spanish  until  1795. 

f  Better  known  as  General  Guy  Carleton.  He  was  created  Baron 
Dorchester  in  1786. 


Humphreys,  after  a  tempestuous  passage  of  five  weeks, 
reached  London  on  the  morning  of  October  14,  and  found 
that  the  confident  tone  the  ministry  had  adopted  in  the 
summer  had  altered.  A  feeling  prevailed  that  Spain  was 
artfully  putting  off  a  settlement  while  sounding  the  attitude 
of  France,  and  the  prospect  of  her  assistance  in  case  of 
actual  war.*  Still  war  seemed  more  probable  than  peace  ; 
the  stock  market  was  uncertain,  insurance  was  at  war  prem- 
ium, the  press  gang  was  still  at  work,  and  all  the  usual  prep- 
arations for  war  were  being  pushed.  "While  the  powers  of 
Europe  are  in  such  a  political  ferment,  America  is  daily 
growing  of  more  importance  in  their  view.  A  report  has 
prevailed  in  this  place  that  Spain  has  lately  made  some 
declaration,  with  respect  to  conceding  to  the  United  States 
the  free  navigation  of  the  Mississippi.  I  took  considerable 
pains  to  trace  it,  and  yesterday  was  told  Col.  f  Miranda  had 
seen  it  in  a  letter  to  the  Spanish  ambassador  himself.  My 
informant  received  the  intelligence  from  Miranda."  }  Six 
Cherokee  chiefs  came  to  London,  "as  ambassadors  from  a 
nation  which  (according  to  the  English  printed  communi- 
cation) has  20,000  men  in  arms  ready  to  assist  G.  Britain 
against  Spain" — an  assertion  as  ludicrous  as  it  was  prepos- 
terous. Up  to  the  hour  of  his  leaving  England — 4  No- 
vember— Humphreys  was  unable  to  say  whether  the  com- 
plication would  terminate  in  peace  or  war,  although  the  con- 
vention with  Spain  had  then  been  signed  nearly  a  week  (28 
October),  and  the  immediate  end  of  his  mission  to  Spain 

*  Humphreys  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  London,  14  October,  1790. 

f  Count. 

\  Humphreys  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  20  October,  1790. 


32 

rendered  abortive.  On  reaching  Lisbon,  two  weeks  later, 
he  learned  of  the  agreement,  and  in  vague  terms  of  the 
details  covered. 

Humphreys,  however,  determined  to  go  to  Madrid,  and 
leaving  Lisbon  on  the  3d  of  December  he  reached  the 
Spanish  capital  on  the  lyth,  after  a  tedious  journey,  travel- 
ling from  daylight  to  dark,  and  making  but  one  stop  about 
an  hour  in  the  middle  of  the  day.  The  convention  was 
then  being  "partially  circulated,"  printed  on  a  single  sheet 
in  Spanish  and  French,*  but  for  nearly  two  weeks  the 
special  messenger  sent  no  dispatch  to  the  American  Secre- 
tary ot  State.  On  the  3d  of  January,  1791,  he  broke  silence 
and  in  cipher  wrote  to  Jefferson  : — 

[In  cipher] 

MADRID,  3  January,  1791. 

I  have  had,  sir,  many  conversations  with  Mr.  Carmichael 
on  the  subject  of  your  letter  to  him.  If  it  had  arrived  early 
in  summer,  he  thinks  we  might  have  obtained  all  our  wishes. 
Then  the  critical  state  of  affairs  induced  the  Comte  de 
Florida  Blanca  to  throw  out  those  general  assertions  that  we 
should  have  no  reason  to  complain  of  the  conduct  of  this 
Court,  with  respect  to  the  Mississippi,  which  gave  rise  to 
the  report  its  navigation  was  opened.  That  minister  had 
intimations  from  del  Campo  of  the  conferences  between  Mr. 
Morris  and  the  Duke  of  Leeds,  which  occasioned  him  to 
say  with  warmth  to  Mr.  Carmichael,  now  is  your  time  to 
make  a  treaty  with  England.  Fitzherbert  availed  himself 
of  those  conferences  to  create  apprehensions  that  the 
Americans  would  aid  his  nation  in  case  of  war.  Long  time 
the  conduct  of  Spain  was  fluctuating  and  undecided.  After 
a  variety  of  circumstances  (which  Mr.  Carmichael  has  ex- 
plained in  his  dispatches  that  have  miscarried,  and  which  he 

*  Humphreys  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  Madrid,  18  December,  1790. 


33 

will  repeat  in  others  by  me)  a  convention  was  formed 
whereby  the  British  gained  substantially  everything  they  at 
first  demanded.  Want  of  money  to  support  a  war  and  the 
Queen's  intrigues,  together  with  advice  from  the  Comte 
Montemorin  that  peace  was  essential  to  France,  were  prob- 
ably the  principal  causes  which  compelled  Spain  to  yield 
the  point  after  each  side  had  tried  which  could  hold  out 
the  longest.  The  preparations  cost  Spain  sixteen  millions 
dollars.  Thus  the  crisis  most  favorable  for  the  attainment 
of  our  wishes  is  past.  Unless  there  is  some  secret  article  in 
the  Convention  by  which  England  guarantees  the  posses- 
sions of  Spain  in  America,  resentment  may  [indecipherable] 
in  the  Spanish  Court  for  having  been  obliged  to  receive  the 
law.  They  may  also  desire  to  be  in  readiness  for  events. 
How  far  these  or  other  motives  may  operate  in  producing 
change  of  system  with  respect  to  the  United  States,  re- 
mains to  be  learnt  from  an  adherence  to  the  latter  part  of 
your  instructions  to  Mr.  Carmichael. 

The  fact  is  clear  that  the  United  States  are  daily  gaining 
political  consideration  in  Europe.  Spain,  guided  by  narrow 
policy  towards  its  colonies,  fears  the  consequence  of  our 
increasing  strength  and  resources.  The  Compte  de  Florida 
Blanca  has  been  so  long  and  so  obstinately  opposed  to  the 
admission  of  foreign  vessels  into  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  that 
the  most  he  can  ever  be  persuaded  to  do,  will  be  to  suffer 
somebody  else  to  negotiate,  to  whom,  if  there  be  blame  for 
inconsistency  in  policy,  the  fault  may  be  imputed.  But 
the  Compte  not  being  well  with  the  Queen,  loses  credit ; 
and  recent  circumstances  indicate  that  he  is  but  the  osten- 
sible, while  le  Rena  (at  the  head  of  the  finance)  is  the  real 
minister.  Mr.  Carmichael  thinks,  that  if  the  Compte  will 
not  consent  to  open  a  negotiation  with  liberal  views,  it  may 
be  possible  to  displace  him  and  find  a  successor  of  better 
dispositions :  that  is,  if  the  Queen  lives,  but  she  is  appre- 
hensive of  dying  in  childbed  next  month,  which  event 
would  give  the  Compte  more  weight  than  ever.  Campo- 
manes,  who  is  the  head  of  the  judicators,  Compte  de  Aranda, 


34 

and  many  others,  entertain  just  ideas  with  respect  to  our 
country.  The  first  is  high  in  influence  and  secretly  an 
enemy  to  the  Compte  de  Florida  Blanca ;  the  last,  at  the 
head  of  opposition,  will  not  come  into  office  himself,  but,  in 
case  of  a  change  of  administration,  some  of  his  friends  will 
succeed.  Mr.  Carmichael,  being  on  terms  of  intimacy  with 
the  characters  here,  is  certainly  capable  of  effecting  more  at 
this  Court  than  any  other  American.  .  .  . 

Something  also  gives  uneasiness  to  this  Court.  Affairs  do 
not  go  well.  Frequent  councils  are  convened.  The  gov- 
ernment is  feeble,  jealous,  mercenary  and  unpopular.  The 
King  is  a  well-disposed,  passionate,  weak  man.  The  Queen 
(a  shrewd,  well-instructed  woman,  addicted  to  pleasure  and 
expense)  governs  the  kingdom.  She  is  not  beloved.  Nor 
did  either  of  them  receive  the  usual  acclamations  of  the 
people  when  they  returned  from  their  country  residence  last 
fall.  The  Queen  has  even  been  insulted,  which  makes  her 
appear  rarely  in  public.  For  this  offense  twelve  washer- 
women have  been  confined,  and  their  husbands  banished 
the  kingdom,  because  they  petitioned  for  their  release. 
Several  natives  of  distinction  have  lately  been  exiled  from 
the  capital  to  the  provinces,  among  others  the  Comptesse  of 
Galvez.  Compte  Segur,  a  Frenchman  accused  of  being  the 
author  of  a  libel  against  the  Queen,  within  a  week  past  died 
of  rigorous  confinement.  This  government,  alarmed  at  the 
success  of  the  revolution  in  France,  shows  great  distrust 
and  hatred  of  the  French.  Several  have  been  arrested  at 
midnight  and  hurried  out  of  the  country.  People  begin  to 
think  and  even  to  speak  in  private  circles  freely.  In  some 
provinces  dissatisfaction  prevails  on  account  of  new  taxes. 
Three  regiments  are  just  sent  into  Gallicia  to  quell  those  dis- 
turbances, where  an  attempt  was  made  to  assassinate  the  new 
general  on  the  road.  General  Lacy  (who  commands  at 
Barcelona  and  has  been  obliged  to  menace  the  city  by  turn- 
ing the  cannon  against  it)  is  continually  writing  to  Court 
for  men  and  military  supplies.  Tho'  the  Spaniards  in  many 
places  retain  the  appearance,  habits  and  manners  of  a  people 


35 

who  have  but  lately  lost  their  liberty,  yet  affairs  are  not  ripe 
for  reformation,  from  want  of  leaders,  information  and 
means  of  combination.  The  utmost  diligence  is  used  to 
suppress  intelligence  from  other  countries.  Notwithstanding 
I  had  the  necessary  passports,  at  the  frontier  town  I  was 
delayed  a  day  and  not  permitted  to  proceed,  until  the 
officers  of  police  had  put  my  letters  under  cover  to  the 
police  in  Madrid.  This  having  been  done  in  my  presence, 
they  delivered  them  to  me,  with  an  apology  for  the  strict- 
ness of  their  orders.  On  my  arrival  at  Madrid,  I  went 
directly  to  Mr.  Carmichael,  and  upon  his  application  to  the 
Compte  de  Florida  Blanca,  the  letters  (which  had  remained 
in  my  trunk  under  the  seal  of  government,)  were  returned 
unopened  into  my  hand.  But  notwithstanding  all  precau- 
tions, letters,  newspapers  and  pamphlets  come  from  France 
into  this  kingdom.  Interesting  paragraphs  are  copied,  cir- 
culated, and  read  with  avidity.  .  .  . 

[In  Cipher] 

MADRID,  15  January,  1791. 

Sir :  I  have  employed  my  time  here  in  communicating 
according  to  instructions  the  sentiments  of  the  President  on 
the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi,  and  other  important  points. 
Mr.  Carmichael's  ideas  are  just ;  his  exertions  will  be  power- 
ful and  unremitting  to  obtain  the  accomplishment  of  our 
desires  before  his  departure  from  this  country ;  the  task 
will  now  be  difficult,  if  not  impracticable,  from  the  opinions 
which  are  impressed  on  this  court.  I  fear  these  are  rather 
riveted  than  impressed  to  the  very  substance  of  their  former 
jealous  policy.  I  learn  from  other  good  authority,  as  well  as 
from  Mr.  Carmichael,  that  all  the  representations  of  Gardoqui 
(when  minister  in  America)  tended  to  excite  a  belief  that 
the  most  respectable  and  influential  people  throughout  the 
United  States  did  not  wish  to  have  the  navigation  of  the 
Mississippi  opened  for  years  to  come,  from  an  apprehension 
that  such  an  event  would  weaken  the  government,  and  impov- 
erish the  Atlantic  States  by  emigrations.  It  was  even  pre- 


36 

tended  that  none  but  a  handful  of  settlers  on  the  western 
waters,  and  a  few  inhabitants  of  the  southern  states,  would 
acquiesce  in  the  measure. 

At  present  affairs  here  are  guided  more  by  intrigue  than 
by  reason.  So  that  no  one  can  answer  for  the  consequence 
of  a  negotiation.  Means  are  used  to  bring  our  subject  with 
advantage  into  discussion.  The  king  is  just  gone  to  hunt 
for  two  days ;  play  is  usual  after  the  holidays ;  his  prime 
minister  and  the  family  ambassadors  only  attended  him. 
Nothing  can  be  ascertained  until  his  return. 

It  is  not  improbable  a  change  of  ministry  may  soon  take 
place.  The  situation  about  the  Court  becomes  every  day 
more  critical.  Nor  is  it  less  so  in  the  country.  The  night 
before  last,  twenty-two  French  and  Italians  were  sent  from 
Madrid  under  guard,  out  of  the  kingdom,  for  speaking  too 
freely ;  as  was  one  Spanish  Marquis  to  a  distant  province. 


For  nine  days  longer  Humphreys  remained  in  Madrid  in 
the  character  of  a  traveller,  hoping  that  Carmichael  could 
obtain  an  audience  with  Count  Florida  Blanca.  Disap- 
pointed in  this,  he  returned  to  Lisbon,  leaving  the  conduct 
of  whatever  questions  might  arise  in  the  hands  of  Car- 
michael. 

"As  the  business  with  which  he  is  now  charged  requires 
to  be  managed  with  uncommon  address  and  delicacy,  I 
have  advised  him  to  seize  some  good  occasion  for  obtaining 
a  particular  audience  to  explain  our  desires  specifically,  but 
in  the  most  discreet  manner,  with  the  reasons  and  motives 
on  which  they  are  founded.  And  I  have  told  him,  that  I 
apprehended  the  sooner  this  could  be  done,  the  better  it 
would  be  ;  since  the  affairs  of  Europe,  far  from  being  settled, 
may  soon  produce  a  crisis  highly  favorable  to  the  promotion 
of  our  interests ;  and  since  our  western  settlers  cannot  long 
brook  delay.  Hitherto  he  had  only  found  a  casual  oppor- 
tunity (that  is  to  say,  immediately  after  my  arrival)  to  sug- 


37 

gest  to  the  minister,  in  general  terms  without  abruptness, 
our  sincere  disposition  to  be  connected  with  Spain,  in  the 
most  liberal  and  friendly  manner ;  and  for  this  purpose  the 
apparent  expediency  of  making  arrangements  respecting 
the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi,  before  any  ill  adventures 
shall  happen  in  that  quarter."* 

What  occurred  immediately  after  Humphreys'  departure 
is  described  in  a  letter  that  Carmichael  wrote  to  Jefferson, 
interesting  not  only  in  connection  with  this  special  mission, 
but  also  as  showing  the  difficulties  under  which  Carmichael 
was  placed  while  in  Spain. 

MADRID,  24  January,  1791. 

Sir :  Colonel  Humphreys  delivered  to  me  your  letter  of 
the  6th  of  August  on  the  i8th  of  the  last  month ;  nothing 
could  equal  my  astonishment  in  finding  that  I  have  been 
employing  my  time  in  a  situation  that  has  been  for  many 
years  disagreeable,  so  little  to  my  own  credit  or  to  the  sat- 
isfaction of  my  own  country. 

The  only  method  which  I  could  take  in  the  moment  was 
to  show  to  a  man  who  justly  merits  the  confidence  placed  in 
him,  the  pains  I  had  taken  for  information,  and  how  im- 
probable it  was  that  I  should  spend  my  time  and  even  my 
own  fortune  to  procure  intelligence  without  transmitting  the 
materials  which  I  obtained  with  great  difficulty  and  consid- 
erable expense,  that  at  least  prove  my  zeal,  tho'  perhaps  not 
my  talents. 

The  next  object  will  be  to  forward  copies  of  all  the  dis- 
patches which  I  find  by  your  letter  have  not  reached  the 
Department.  I  cannot  account  for  the  detention  of  my 
letters.  I  know  that  I  have  had  powerful  enemies  here,  who 
from  personal  motives  have  in  many  instances  endeavored 
to  injure  me. 

I  discovered  that  a  servant  who  had  lived  with  me  more 

*  Humphreys  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  Lisbon,  6  February,  1791. 


38 

than  six  years  had  received  money  to  a  considerable  amount 
from  one  of  these  persons,  the  C!  Cabarras.  He  has  paid, 
and  is  paying,  dearly  the  suborning  my  domestics,  yet  more 
from  his  own  imprudence  than  my  efforts. 

On  the  26th  of  February,  I  gave  an  account  of  a  friendly 
conversation  which  I  had  with  the  Cl.e  de  Florida  Blanca  on 
that  subject,  which  terminated  to  our  mutual  satisfaction. 

The  President  will  have  probably  communicated  to  you 
the  letter  I  had  the  honor  to  write  him  on  the  first  notice  of 
his  nomination  :  Least  that  letter  should  not  have  met  with 
better  fortune  than  so  many  others  have  done,  I  inclose  a 
copy,  as  also  one  I  wrote  from  Aranjuez  on  being  advised  by 
you  that  he  had  been  pleased  to  continue  me  in  my  present 
employment. 

You  will  see  that  I  have  no  interested  motive  to  influence 
my  conduct ;  I  can  say  with  truth  that  I  have  now  to  begin 
life  (so  far  as  the  expression  may  be  applied  to  independ- 
ence and  domestic  ease),  and  I  thought  I  could  have  done 
it  with  pleasure,  until  I  received  your  letters  by  Colonel 
Humphreys. 

I  announced  to  the  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs  the 
time  and  the  manner  in  which  I  received  the  cyphers  sent 
me.  Colonel  Humphreys  has  seen  by  the  covers  of  those 
cyphers,  and  by  certificates  I  took  from  persons  who  were 
present,  or  who  delivered  them,  that  it  would  have  been 
highly  imprudent  in  me  to  have  made  use  of  them.  If 
they  have  ever  been  employed,  no  letter  in  cypher  has  ever 
reached  me. 

I  sent  duplicates  of  these  certificates  immediately  to  the 
department,  and  I  find  that  by  the  list  which  you  send  me 
of  letters  received  that  these  have  not  come  to  hand. 

You  will  pardon  this  detail.  It  is  necessary  for  my  own 
tranquillity,  which  has  suffered  more  than  I  can  express  for 
several  years  past,  and  more  particularly  since  I  have  re- 
ceived your  last  letter.  If  my  letters  since  the  26th  of  Feb- 
ruary have  reached  you,  you  will  be  convinced  that  no  one 
here  in  the  diplomatic  line  was  so  early  or  better  informed 


39 

than  I  have  been  with  respect  to  the  apparent  rupture  be- 
tween this  country  and  Great  Britain.  I  knew  how  it 
would  end,  because  I  knew  that  measures  begun  in  folly 
would  terminate  in  humiliation,  and  humiliation  might  lead 
to  something  more. 

Something  however  might  have  been  done  in  a  moment 
of  projects  and  apprehension,  had  not  a  certain  negotiation 
carried  on  our  part  at  London  transpired,  and  which  I  think 
was  known  here  rather  from  British  policy  than  from  the 
vigilance  of  the  Marquis  del  Campo.  Entirely  unacquainted 
with  this  manoeuvre,  although  in  correspondence  with  the 
person  employed,  I  was  suspected  to  be  in  the  secret. 
This  suspicion  banished  confidence,  which  returns  by  slow 
degrees.  This  circumstance  induced  me  to  stop  entirely 
my  correspondence  with  G.  M. ;  to  continue  it  would  have 
done  harm,  and  certainly  could  do  no  good. 

I  have  seen  extracts  from  the  President's  letter  commu- 
nicated to  the  Duke  of  Leeds,  perhaps  mutilated  or  forged, 
to  serve  here  the  views  of  the  British  Cabinet :  I  do  not  yet 
dispair  of  obtaining  copies  of  those  letters  thro'  the  same 
channel  that  I  procured  the  first  account  of  the  demands  of 
G.  B.,  and  the  signature  of  the  late  convention. 

You  will  easily  conceive  that  I  must  now  discretionally 
obey  (from  the  change  of  ciicumstances)  the  latter  part  of 
the  instructions  given  me ;  but,  sir,  the  opportunities  of 
seeing  the  minister  in  the  character  I  hold,  are  so  rare,  that 
there  is  little  room  for  information  (  ?) .  However  active, 
however  punctual,  I  may  be,  I  must  wait  until  every  ambas- 
sador, every  minister,  even  if  there  was  one  from  the  Repub- 
lic of  Ragusa,  have  had  their  audience,  before  I  can  obtain 
mine.  You  will  see  by  the  enclosed  paper  No.  i,*  the  con- 
versation I  have  had  with  the  minister.  I  have  endeavored 
indirectly  to  suggest  ideas  of  the  necessity  of  a  speedy 
determination  in  this  government  to  adopt  the  measures 
pointed  out  by  your  last  letters.  These  suggestions  have 
been  made  to  persons  who  have  now,  and  probably  will 

*Missing. 


4o 

have  in  future,  much  influence  in  the  Cabinet,  if  the  Queen 
lives.  I  shall  communicate  to  you  the  effects  which  my 
representations  may  produce,  and  with  Colonel  Humphrey's 
advice  and  approbation.  If  occasion  offers,  and  circum- 
stances permit,  I  shall  decidedly  press  the  business. 

This  government  is  weak ;  the  ministry  is  in  a  ticklish 
situation ;  the  Queen  governs,  and  governs  with  caprice  ;  the 
people  begin  to  dispute  their  sovereigns ;  and  altho'  they  have 
no  chiefs  to  look  up  to,  the  dissatisfaction  is  general.  .  .  . 

There  is  probably  something  in  agitation  here  with  re- 
spect to  the  affairs  of  the  north.  I  shall  endeavor  to  develop 
this  business.  Here  they  hold  themselves  in  readiness  to 
arm.  The  object  is  doubtful  and  unaccountable.  It  is  a 
mixture  of  haughtiness  and  timidity.  In  fact,  after  having 
blundered  into  humiliation  abroad,  they  want  to  appear 
respectable  at  home.  This  is  an  observation  made  to  me 
by  the  Cl.  de  Campomanes,  Governor  of  the  Council  of 
Castile,  who  is,  with  those  he  can  influence,  decidedly  of 
opinion  that  it  is  the  interest  of  his  country  to  form  liberal 
and  lasting  connections  with  the  United  States.  ...  * 

WM.  CARMICHAEL. 

Gouverneur  Morris  had  been  authorized  in  October,  1 789, 
to  confer  with  the  British  ministers  in  order  to  learn  their 
sentiments  on  the  matters  of  controversy  pending  between 
the  United  States  and  Great  Britain,  and  arising  mainly 
from  the  treaty  of  1783 — that  is,  the  detention  of  the  western 
posts  by  England,  the  question  of  indemnification  for  negroes 
carried  off  contrary  to  treaty,  a  commercial  treaty,  and  an  ex- 
change of  ministers  between  the  two  powers.  Morris  had 
reported  in  substance  that  the  ministers  "equivocate  on 
every  proposal  of  a  treaty  of  commerce,  and  authorize  in 
their  communications  with  Mr.  Morris  the  same  conclusions 

*This  letter  was  received  by  Jefferson,  March  3131. 


which  have  been  drawn  from  those  they  had  had  from  time 
to  time  with  Mr.  Adams,  and  those  through  Maj?  Beckwith  :* 
to  wit,  that  they  do  not  mean  to  submit  their  present  advan- 
tages in  commerce  to  the  risk  which  might  attend  a  discus- 
sion of  them,  whereon  some  reciprocity  could  not  fail  to  be 
demanded — unless  indeed  we  would  agree  to  make  it  a 
treaty  of  alliance,  as  well  as  of  commerce,  so  as  to  under- 
mine our  obligations  with  France.  This  mode  of  stripping 
that  rival  nation  of  its  alliances  they  tried  successfully  with 
Holland,  endeavored  at  with  Spain,  and  have  plainly  and 
repeatedly  suggested  to  us.  For  this  they  would  probably 
relax  some  of  the  rigours  they  exercise  against  our  commerce. 
That  as  to  a  minister,  their  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs  is 
disposed  to  exchange  one,  but  meets  with  opposition  in  his 
cabinet,  so  as  to  render  the  issue  uncertain."!  Hence  Jeff- 
erson concluded  "that it  would  be  dishonorable  to  the  U.  S., 
useless,  even  injurious,  to  renew  the  propositions  for  a  treaty 
of  commerce,  or  for  the  exchange  of  a  minister :  and  that 
these  subjects  should  now  remain  dormant,  till  they  shall  be 
brought  forward  earnestly  by  them."}  The  President  re- 
ported to  the  Senate,  14  February,  1791,  that  from  these 
conferences  of  Morris,  he  did  "  not  infer  any  disposition  on 
their  part  to  enter  into  any  arrangements  merely  commercial 

*  Major,  afterwards  Sir  George  Beckwith,  had  served  in  the  British 
army  through  the  Revolution,  aud  from  1787  to  1791,  when  there  was 
no  British  minister  accredited  to  the  United  States,  he  was  entrusted 
with  "  an  important  and  confidential  mission,"  acting,  in  fact,  as  an  un- 
recognized diplomatic  agent.  It  was  for  his  services  in  the  West  Indies 
that  he  was  knighted. 

f  Jefferson's  summary  of  Morris's  letters. 

J  Jefferson's  report  to  the  President,  15  December,  1790. 
4 


42 

.  .  .  unless  it  could  be  extended  to  a  treaty  of  alliance, 
offensive  and  defensive,  or  unless  in  the  event  of  a  rupture 
with  Spain." 

Here  ended  the  episode.  It  may  be  remembered  that 
in  July,  1797,  William  Blount  was  expelled  from  the  Senate 
for  being  concerned  in  a  conspiracy  to  deliver  New  Orleans 
into  the  hands  of  the  British,  and  for  having  instigated  the 
Creeks  and  Cherokees  to  assist  the  British  to  conquer 
Louisiana. 

WORTHINGTON  CHAUNCEY  FORD. 

Washington,  August,  1890. 


[Secret] 
UNITED  STATES,  27  August,  1790. 

Provided  the  dispute  between  Great  Britain  and 
Spain  should  come  to  the  decision  of  arms,  from  a 
variety  of  circumstances  (Individually  unimportant  and 
inconclusive,  but  very  much  the  reverse  when  com- 
pared and  combined),  there  is  no  doubt  in  my  mind  that 
New  Orleans  and  the  Spanish  ports  above  it  on  the 
Mississippi,  will  be  among  the  first  attempt?  of  the 
former,  and  that  the  reduction  of  them  will  be  under- 
taken by  a  combined  operation  from  Detroit. 

The  consequences  of  having  so  formidable  and  enter- 
prising a  people  as  the  British  on  both  our  flanks  and 
rear,  with  their  navy  in  front,  as  they  respect  our 
western  settlements  which  may  be  seduced  thereby,  as 
they  regard  the  security  of  the  Union  and  its  commerce 
with  the  West  Indies,  are  too  obvious  to  need  enumer- 
ation. 

What  then  should  be  the  answer  of  the  Executive 
of  the  United  States  to  L*  Dorchester,  in  case  he 
should  apply  for  permission  to  march  troops  through 
the  territory  of  the  U*  States  from  Detroit  to  the 
Mississippi  ? 

What  notice  ought  to  be  taken  of  the  measure,  if  it 
(43) 


44 

should  be  undertaken  without  leave,  which  is  the  most 
probable  proceeding  of  the  two  ?  * 

*  August  27,  1890,  Washington  placed  on  paper  these  questions, 
and  sent  them  to  the  Vice- President,  the  members  of  his  Cabinet,  and 
the  Chief  Justice,  requesting  their  opinion  in  writing.  A  distinction, 
perhaps  of  no  importance,  was  made  in  the  manner  of  asking  these 
gentlemen;  for  the  opinion  of  the  members  of  the  Cabinet  was  «  re- 
quested to  be  given,"  but  «  Mr.  Jay  will  oblige  the  President  of  the 
United  States  by  giving  his  opinion."  As  to  the  form  used  with  Mr. 
Adams,  no  record  appears. 


REPLY  OF  THE  VICE-PRESIDENT. 

NEW  YORK,  29  August,  1 790. 

SIR  :  That  New  Orleans,  and  the  Spanish  ports  on 
the  Mississippi,  will  be  among  the  first  attempts  of  the 
English,  in  case  of  a  war  with  Spain,  appears  very 
probable :  and  that  a  combined  operation  from  Detroit 
would  be  convenient  to  that  end  cannot  be  doubted. 

The  consequences  on  the  western  settlements,  on 
the  commerce  with  the  West  Indies,  and  on  the  gen- 
eral security  and  tranquillity  of  the  American  confed- 
eration, of  having  them  in  our  rear,  and  on  both  our 
flanks,  with  their  navy  in  front,  are  very  obvious. 

The  interest  of  the  United  States  duly  weighed,  and 
their  duty  conscientiously  considered,  point  out  to 
them,  in  the  case  of  such  a  war,  a  neutrality,  as  long 
as  it  may  be  practicable.  The  people  of  these  States 
would  not  willingly  support  a  war,  and  the  present 
government  has  not  strength  to  command,  nor  enough 
of  the  general  confidence  of  the  nation  to  draw  the 
men  or  money  necessary,  until  the  grounds,  causes  and 
necessity  of  it  should  become  generally  known,  and 
universally  approved.  A  pacific  character,  in  opposi- 
tion to  a  war-like  temper,  a  spirit  of  conquest,  or  a 
disposition  to  military  enterprise,  is  of  great  import- 
ance to  us  as  to  preserve  in  Europe:  and  therefore,  we 
should  not  engage  even  in  defensive  war,  until  the 
(45) 


46 

necessity  of  it  should  become  apparent,  or  at  least 
until  we  have  it  in  our  power  to  make  it  manifest,  in 
Europe  as  well  as  at  home. 

In  order  to  preserve  an  honest  neutrality,  or  even 
the  reputation  of  a  disposition  to  it,  the  United  States 
must  avoid  as  much  as  possible  every  real  wrong,  and 
even  every  appearance  of  injury  to  either  party.  To 
grant  to  Lord  Dorchester,  in  case  he  should  request  it, 
permission  to  march  troops  through  the  territory  of 
the  United  States,  from  Detroit  to  the  Mississippi, 
would  not  only  have  an  appearance  offensive  to  the 
Spaniards,  of  partiality  to  the  English,  but  would  be  a 
real  injury  to  Spain.  The  answer  therefore  to  his 
lordship  should  be  a  refusal,  in  terms  clear  and  decided, 
but  guarded  and  dignified,  in  a  manner  which  no 
Power  has  more  at  command  than  the  President  of  the 
United  States. 

If  a  measure  so  daring,  offensive  and  hostile  as  the 
march  of  troops  through  our  territory  to  attack  a 
friend,  should  be  hazarded  by  the  English,  without 
leave,  or  especially  after  a  refusal,  it  is  not  so  easy 
to  answer  the  question,  what  notice  ought  to  be  taken 
of  it. 

The  Situation  of  our  Country  is  not  like  that  of  the 
nations  in  Europe.  They  have  generally  large  num- 
bers of  inhabitants  in  narrow  territories :  we  have 
small  numbers  scattered  over  vast  regions.  The 
country  through  which  the  Brittons  must  pass  from 
Detroit  to  the  Mississippi,  is,  I  suppose,  so  thinly  in- 


47 

habited,  and  at  such  a  distance  from  all  the  populous 
settlements,  that  it  would  be  impossible  for  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  to  collect  militia  or  march 
troops  sufficient  to  resist  the  enterprise.  After  the 
step  shall  have  been  taken  there  are  two  ways  for  us  to 
proceed :  one  is  war,  and  the  other  negotiation.  Spain 
would  probably  remonstrate  to  the  President  of  the 
United  States,  but  whether  she  should  or  not,  the 
President  of  the  United  States  should  remonstrate  to  the 
King  of  Great  Britain.  It  would  not  be  expected  I 
suppose,  by  our  friends  or  enemies,  that  the  United 
States  should  declare  war  at  once.  Nations  are  not 
obliged  to  declare  war  for  every  injury  or  even  hos- 
tility. A  tacit  acquiescence  under  such  an  outrage, 
would  be  misinterpreted  on  all  hands;  by  Spain  as  in- 
imical to  her,  and  by  Britain  as  the  effect  of  weakness, 
disunion  and  pusillanimity.  Negotiation  then  is  the 
only  other  alternative. 

Negotiation  in  the  present  state  of  things  is  attended 
with  peculiar  difficulties.  As  the  King  of  Great 
Britain  twice  proposed  to  the  United  States  an  ex- 
change of  ministers,  once  through  Mr-  Hartley  and 
once  through  the  Duke  of  Dorsett,  and  when  the 
United  States  agreed  to  the  proposition,  flew  from  it : 
to  send  a  minister  again  to  St.  James's  till  that  Court 
explicitly  promises  to .  send  one  to  America,  is  an 
humiliation  to  which  the  United  States  ought  never  to 
submit.  A  remonstrance  from  sovereign  to  sovereign 
cannot  be  sent,  but  by  an  ambassador  of  some  order 


48 

or  other :  from  minister  of  state  to  minister  of  state,  it 
might  be  transmitted  in  many  other  ways :  a  remon- 
strance in  the  form  of  a  letter  from  the  American 
Minister  of  State  to  the  Duke  of  Leeds,  or  whoever 
may  be  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs,  might  be 
transmitted,  through  an  envoy,  minister  plenipotentiary, 
or  ambassador  of  the  President  of  the  United  States, 
at  Paris,  Madrid  or  the  Hague,  and  through  the  British 
ambassador  at  either  of  these  courts.  The  utmost 
length  that  can  now  be  gone  with  dignity,  would  be  to 
send  a  minister  to  the  Court  of  London,  with  instruc- 
tions to  present  his  credentials,  demand  an  audi- 
ence, make  his  remonstrance,  but  to  make  no  estab- 
lishment, and  demand  his  audience  of  leave  and  quit 
the  kingdom  in  one,  two  or  three  months,  if  a  minister 
of  equal  degree  were  not  appointed  and  actually  sent 
to  the  President  of  the  United  States  from  the  King  of 
Great  Britain. 

It  is  a  misfortune  that  in  these  critical  moments  and 
circumstances,  the  United  States  have  not  a  minister 
of  large  views,  mature  age,  information  and  judgment, 
and  strict  integrity,  at  the  Courts  of  France,  Spain, 
London  and  the  Hague.  Early  and  authentic  intelli- 
gence from  those  courts  may  be  of  more  importance 
than  the  expense;  but  as  the  representatives  of  the 
people,  as  well  as  the  legislatures,  are  of  a  different 
opinion,  they  have  made  a  very  scanty  provision  for 
but  a  part  of  such  a  system.  As  it  is,  God  knows 
where  the  men  are  to  be  found  who  are  qualified  for 


49 

such  missions  and  would  undertake  them.  By  an  ex- 
perience of  ten  years,  which  made  me  too  unhappy  at 
the  time  to  be  ever  forgotten,  I  know  that  every 
artifice  which  can  deceive,  every  temptation  which  can 
operate  on  hope  or  fear,  ambition  or  avarice,  pride  or 
vanity,  the  love  of  society,  pleasure  or  amusement, 
will  be  employed  to  divert  and  warp  them  from  the 
true  line  of  their  duty  and  the  impartial  honour  and 
interest  of  their  country. 

To  the  superior  lights  and  information  derived  from 
office ;  the  more  serene  temper  and  profound  judgment 
of  the  President  of  the  United  States,  these  crude  and 
hasty  thoughts  concerning  the  points  proposed,  are 
humbly  submitted,  with  every  sentiment  of  respect  and 
sincere  attachment,  by  his  most  obedient  and  most 
humble  servant, 

JOHN  ADAMS. 

The  President  of  the  United  States. 


OPINION  OF  THE  CHIEF  JUSTICE. 

NEW  YORK,  28  August,  1790. 

SIR  :  The  Case  which  I  had  yesterday  the  Honor  of 
receiving  from  you,  gave  occasion  to  the  following 
Remarks  and  Reflections. 

Whether  the  Issue  of  the  Negociations  depending  be- 
tween the  British  and  Spanish  courts  is  Peace  or  War, 
it  certainly  is  prudent  to  anticipate  and  be  prepared 
for  the  consequences  of  either  event  In  the  present 
state  of  things  it  would  doubtless  militate  against  the 
interests  of  the  U.  S.,  that  the  Spanish  territories  in 
question  should  be  reduced,  and  remain  under  the 
Government  of  his  B.  majesty ;  and  probably  that  cir- 
cumstance would  strongly  unite  with  those  others 
which  must  naturally  lead  him  to  regard  the  Posses- 
sion of  these  Countries  as  a  desirable  Object. 

If  Permission  to  march  Troops  for  that  Purpose, 
thro'  the  territories  of  the  U.  S.,  should  be  requested, 
it  will  be  necessary  to  consider 

1.  Whether  the  Laws  of  Nations  entitle  a  belli- 
gerent power  to  a  free  Passage  for  Troops  thro' 
the  Territories  of  a  neutral  Nation?  and 

2,  In  Case  the  Right  to  such  Passage  be   not  a 
perfect  one,  whether  circumstances  render  a  Re- 
fusal or  a  compliance,  most  adviseable  on   the 
present  occasion?    . 

(50) 


The  Right  of  Dominion  involves  that  of  the  exclud- 
ing (under  the  Restrictions  imposed  by  Humanity)  all 
Foreigners.  This  Right  is  very  rigidly  exercised  by 
some  States,  particularly  the  Empire  of  China. 
European  Nations  consider  this  as  a  general  Right  or 
Rule,  and  as  subject  to  Exceptions  in  favor  not  only 
of  nations  at  Peace,  but  also  of  Nations  at  War.  The 
exceptions  with  respect  to  \heformer  do  not  touch  the 
present  question.  Those  which  relate  to  the  latter, 
seem  to  be  comprized  within  two  Classes,  viz-  cases  of 
urgent  necessity,  and  cases  of  Convenience.  The  pres- 
ent case  belongs  to  the  latter.  Vattel,  who  well  un- 
derstood the  subject,  says  in  the  7*  chapter  of  his 
3"?  Book  — 

That  an  innocent  Passage  is  due  to  all  Nations  with 
whom  a  State  is  at  Peace,  and  that  this  comprehends 
Troops  equally  with  Individuals.  That  the  Sovereign 
of  the  Country  is  to  judge  whether  this  Passage  be 
innocent — that  his  Permission  must  be  asked — and  that 
an  Entry  into  his  Territories  without  his  Consent,  is  a 
violation  of  the  Rights  of  Dominion — that  if  the  neutral 
Sovereign  has  good  Reasons  for  refusing  a  Passage, 
he  is  not  bound  to  grant  it ;— but  that  if  his  Refusal  is 
evidently  unjust  (the  Passage  requested  being  unques- 
tionably innocenf)  a  nation  may  do  itself  Justice,  and 
take  by  Force,  what  it  was  unjustly  denied— so  that 
such  Requests  may  be  refused  in  all  cases,  except  in 
those  rare  Instances,  where  it  may  be  most  evidently 
shown  that  the  Passage  required  is  absolutely  without 
Danger  or  Inconvenience. 


52 

If  the  Passage  in  contemplation  should  appear  to  be 
of  this  Complection,  a  Refusal  would  generally  be 
deemed  improper,  unless  the  United  States  should 
declare  and  make  it  an  invariable  maxim  in  their 
Policy,  never  to  permit  the  Troops  of  any  Nation  to  pass 
thro'  their  country.  Such  a  measure  might  be  wise,  in 
case  the  the  U.  S.  were  in  capacity  to  act  accordingly; 
but  that  not  being  as  yet  the  Case,  it  would  perhaps  in 
the  present  moment  be  unreasonable. 

I  say  "  such  a  measure  might  be  wise" — whether  it 
would  or  not,  is  a  question  that  involves  others,  both 
legal  and  political,  of  great  magnitude.  Nations  have 
perfect  Rights.  Regard  to  mutual  Convenience  may 
and  often  does  induce  Relaxations  in  the  Exercise  of 
them ;  and  those  Relaxations,  from  Time  and  Usage, 
gradually  assume  to  a  certain  Degree  the  Nature  of 
Rights.  I  think  it  would  appear  on  a  full  investigation 
of  the  Subject,  that  the  United  States  being  a  new 
Nation,  are  not  bound  to  yield  the  same  Relaxations, 
which  in  Europe  from  long  Practice  and  Acquiescence 
amount  almost  to  an  implied  Cession ;  and  therefore, 
that  they  may  justly  exercise  rigorously  the  Right  of 
denying  free  Passage  to  foreign  Troops.  It  is  also  to 
be  observed,  that  if  they  deny  this  Priviledge  to  others, 
it  will  also  be  denied  to  them ;  but  this  leads  to  politi- 
cal consequences  and  Considerations  not  necessary  now 
to  develop  or  investigate. 

If  a  Passage  should  be  requested  and  insisted  upon, 
on  the  Ground  of  its  being  perfectly  innocent,  and  ac- 


53 

companied  with  such  Terms  and  Precautions,  as  that  a 
Refusal,  altho'  justifiable,  would  not  appear  to  be  more 
than  barely  so ;  then  it  will  be  advisable  to  calculate 
the  Probability  of  their  being  restrained  by  such  a 
Refusal. 

If  the  Probability  should  be,  that  they  would  never- 
theless proceed;  then  it  would  become  important  to 
consider  whether  it  would  not  be  better  to  grant  Per- 
mission, than  by  a  Refusal  to  hazard  one  of  two  en- 
evitable  Inconveniences,  viz'  that  of  opposing  their 
Progress  by  Force  of  arms,  and  thereby  risque  being 
involved  in  the  war ;  or  of  submitting  to  the  Disgrace 
and  Humiliation  of  permitting  them  to  proceed  with 
impunity.  In  my  opinion  it  would  in  such  a  Case  be 
most  prudent,  considering  the  actual  state  of  our 
affairs,  to  consent  to  the  Passage.  The  answer  there- 
fore to  be  given  to  Lord  Dorchester,  in  Case  he  should 
apply  for  Permission  to  march  Troops  thro'  the  Terri- 
tory of  the  U.  S.  from  Detroit  to  the  Mississippi,  will  I 
think  necessarily  depend  on  the  nature  of  the  Propo- 
sitions contained  in  the  application,  compared  with  the 
beforementioned  Principles  and  Probabilities. 

As  to  the  notice  proper  to  be  taken  of  the  measure, 
if  it  should  be  undertaken  without  leave  ?  There  ap- 
pears to  me  to  be  no  choice.  Such  a  measure  would 
then  be  so  manifest  a  Departure  from  the  usage  of 
civilized  Nations,  so  flagrant  and  wanton  a  violation  of 
the  Rights  of  Sovereignty,  and  so  strong  and  indecent 
a  Mark  of  Disrespect  and  Defiance,  that  their  march 


(if  after  Prohibition  persisted  in)  should  I  think  be 
opposed  and  prevented  at  every  Risque  and  Hazard. 

But  these  Remarks  in  my  Judgment  retain  but  little 
Force  when  applied  to  the  leading  of  Troops  from 
Posts  in  their  actual  Possession,  thro'  Territories  un- 
der their  actual  Jurisdiction,  altho'  both  the  Posts  and 
the  Territories  of  right  belong  to  the  U.  S.  If  there- 
fore they  should  march  Troops  from  such  posts,  thro' 
such  Territories,  that  measure  would  not  appear  to  me 
to  afford  particular  cause  of  complaint.  On  their 
arrival  by  such  a  Route  at  the  Mississippi,  they  may 
in  virtue  of  the  8'h  Article  of  the  Treaty  navigate  it  up 
to  its  source,  or  down  to  the  ocean. 

This  Subject  naturally  brings  into  view  a  question 
both  difficult  and  important,  viz'  whether  as  the  Pos- 
session of  the  Floridas  would  afford  G.  Britain  ad- 
ditional Means  and  Facilities  of  annoying  the  U.  S.  the 
latter  would  for  that  Reason  be  justifiable  in  endeav- 
oring to  prevent  it  by  direct  and  hostile  opposition  ? 
The  Danger  of  permitting  any  Nation  so  to  prepon- 
derate, as  to  endanger  the  security  of  others,  intro- 
duced into  the  Politics  the  Idea  of  preserving  a 
Ballance  of  Power.  How  far  the  Principles  which 
have  thence  been  inferred,  are  applicable  to  the  present 
Case,  would  merit  serious  Inquiry,  if  the  U.  S.  had 
only  to  consider  what  might  be  right  and  just  on  the 
occasion ;  but  as  the  state  of  their  affairs  strongly  re- 
commends Peace,  and  as  there  is  much  Reason  to 
presume  that  it  would  be  more  prudent  for  them  at 


55 

present  to  permit  Britain  to  conquer  and  hold  the 
Floridas,  than  engage  in  a  War  to  prevent  it,  such  In- 
quiries would  be  premature. 

With  the  most  perfect  Respect  and  Esteem  I  have 
the  Honor  to  be,  Sir, 

Your  most  obt.  and  most  humble  servant, 

JOHN  JAY. 
The  President  of  the  United  States. 


OPINION  OE  THE  SECRETARY  OF  STATE. 

Opinion  on  the  Questions  stated  in  the  President's 
note  of  August  27,  1790. 

I  am  so  deeply  impressed  with  the  magnitude  of  the 
dangers  which  will  attend  our  government  if  Louisiana 
and  the  Floridas  be  added  to  the  British  Empire,  that 
in  my  opinion  we  ought  to  make  ourselves  parties  in 
the  general  war  expected  to  take  place,  should  this  be 
the  only  means  of  preventing  the  calamity. 

But  I  think  we  should  defer  this  step  as  long  as 
possible ;  because  war  is  full  of  chances  which  may  re- 
lieve us  from  the  necessity  of  interfering ;  and  if  neces- 
sary, still  the  later  we  interfere  the  better  we  shall  be 
prepared. 

It  is  often  indeed  more  easy  to  prevent  the  capture 
of  a  place,  than  to  retake  it.  Should  it  be  so  in  the 
case  in  question,  the  difference  between  the  two  opera- 
tions of  preventing  and  retaking,  will  not  be  so  costly 
as  two,  three,  or  four  years  more  of  war. 

So  that  I  am  for  preserving  neutrality  as  long,  and 
entering  into  the  war  as  late,  as  possible. 

If  this  be  the  best  course,  it  decides  in  a  good  de- 
gree what  should  be  our  conduct  if  the  British  ask 
leave  to  march  troops  thro'  our  territory,  or  march 
them  without  leave. 

It  is  well  enough  agreed  in  the  Law  of  Nations,  that 
(56) 


57 

for  a  Neutral  power  to  give  or  refuse  permission  to 
the  troops  of  either  belligerent  party  to  pass  through 
their  territory,  is  no  breach  of  neutrality,  provided  the 
same  refusal  or  permission  be  extended  to  the  other 
party. 

If  we  give  leave  of  passage  then  to  the  British 
troops,  Spain  will  have  no  just  cause  of  complaint 
against  us,  provided  we  extend  the  same  leave  to  her 
when  demanded. 

If  we  refuse  (as  indeed  we  have  a  right  to  do),  and 
the  troops  should  pass  notwithstanding,  of  which 
there  can  be  little  doubt,  we  shall  stand  committed. 
For  either  we  must  enter  immediately  into  the  war,  or 
pocket  an  acknowledged  insult  in  the  face  of  the 
world ;  and  one  insult  pocketed  soon  produces  an- 
other. 

There  is  indeed  a  middle  course,  which  I  should  be 
inclined  to  prefer,  that  is,  to  avoid  giving  any  answer. 
They  will  proceed  notwithstanding.  But  to  do  this 
under  our  silence,  will  admit  of  palliation  and  produce 
apologies  from  military  necessity ;  and  will  leave  us 
free  to  pass  it  over  without  dishonor,  or  to  make  it  a 
handle  of  quarrel  hereafter,  if  we  should  have  use  for 
it  as  such.  But  if  we  are  obliged  to  give  an  answer, 
I  think  the  occasion  not  such  as  should  induce  us  to 
hazard  that  answer  which  might  commit  us  to  the  war 
at  so  early  a  stage  of  it ;  and  therefore  that  the  passage 
should  be  permitted. 

*If  they  should  pass  without  having  asked  leave,  I 
5 


58 

should  be  for  expressing  our  dissatisfaction  to  the 
British  court,  and  keeping  alive  an  altercation  on  the 
subject,  till  events  should  decide  whether  it  is  most 
expedient  to  accept  their  apologies,  or  profit  of  the 
aggression  as  a  cause  of  war. 

TH:  JEFFERSON. 
August  28,  1790. 


HEADS  OF  CONSIDERATION  ON  THE  NAVIGATION  OF 
THE  MISSISSIPPI,  FOR  M?  CARMICHAEL. 

2  August,  1790. 
We  have  a  right  to  the  Navig'n  of  the  Missi. 

1.  by  Nature. 

2.  by  Treaty. 
It  is  necessary  to  us 

More  than  half  the  territory  of  the  U.  S.  is  on  the 
waters  of  that  river. 

200,000  of  their  citizens  are  seated  on  them. 
These  have  no  other  outlet  for  their  tob?,  rice,  corn, 
hemp,  lumber,  house-timber,  ship-timber,  etc. 
We  have  hitherto  borne  the  indecision  of  Spain,  Because 
we  wish  peace. 

because  our  Western  citizens  have  had  vent  at  home 
for  their  productions. 
A  surplus  of  production  begins  now  to  demand  foreign 

markets. 

Whenever  they  shall  say  'We  cannot,  we  will  not,  be 
longer  shut  up,'  the  U.  S.  will  soon  be  reduced  to  the 
following  dilemma : 

1.  to  force  them  to  acquiescence. 

2.  to  separate  from  them,  rather  than  take  part  in  a 
war  against  Spain. 

3.  or  to  preserve  them  in  our  Union,  by  joining  them 
in  the  war. 

The  ist  is  neither  in  our  principles  nor  our  power. 
2.  A  multitude  of  reasons  decide  against  the  2d. 

One  only  shall  be  spoken  out :  the  Nation  that  gives 
(59) 


6o 

up  half  its  territory,  rather  than  engage  in  a  just  war 
to  preserve  it,  will  not  keep  the  other  half  long. 

3.  the  third  is  the  only  alternative  we  must  necessarily 
adopt. 

How  are  we  to  obtain  that  navigation  ? 
A.  By  Force. 

I.  Acting  separately. 

that  we  can  Effect  this  with  certainty  and  prompt- 
itude all  circumstances  decide. 

Obj.  We  cannot  retain  N.  Orleans,  for  instance,  were  we 
to  take  it. 

Ans.  A  moderate  force  may  be  so  secured  so  as  to  hold 
out  till  succoured.  Our  succours  can  be  prompt  and 
effectual. 

Suppose  after  taking  it,  we  withdraw  our  force. 

If  Spain  retakes  it  by  an  expedition,  we  can  recover 
it  by  a  counter-exped'n,  and  so,  as  often  as  the  case 
shall  happen. 

Their  expeditions  will  be  slow,  expensive,  and  lead 
to  catastrophe.  Ours  sudden,  economical,  and  a 
check  can  have  no  consequences. 

We  should  associate  the  country  to  our  union,  the  inhab- 
itants wish  this. 

they  are  not  disposed  to  be  of  the  Spanish  govern- 
ment. 

It  is  idle  in  Spain  to  suppose  our  Western  habitants  will 
submit  to  their  gov'm't. 

they  could  be  quiet  but  a  short  time  under  a  gov'm't 
so  repugnant  to  their  feelings.  Were  they  to  come 
under  it  for  present  purposes,  it  W?  be  with  a  view 
to  throw  it  off  soon.  Should  they  remain  they  would 


6i 

communicate  a  spirit  of  independence  to  those  with 
whom  they  should  be  mixed. 

II.  Acting  in  conjunction  with  Gr.  Br.  with  a  view 
to  partition,  the  Floridas  (includ?  N.  Orleans) 
would  be  assigned  to  us. 

Louisiana  (or  all  the  country  on  the  West?  waters 
of  y6  Missi.)  to  them. 

We  confess  that  such  an  Alliance  is  not  what  we  would 
wish ; 

because  it  may  eventually  lead  us  into  embarrassing 
situations  as  to  our  best  friend,  and  put  the  power  of 
two  n'bors  into  y6  hands  of  one. 
L1?  Lansdowne  has  declared  he  gave  the  Floridas  to 
Spain  rather  than  to  the  U.  S.  as  a  bone  of  discord 
with  the  H.  of  Bourbon,  and  of  reunion  with  Gr.  Br. 
Connolly's  attempt*  (as  well  as  other  facts)  proves 
they  keep  it  in  view. 
B.  By  Negociation. 

I.  What  must  Spain  do  of  necessity  ? 

The  conduct  of  Spain  has  proved  the  occlusion  of 
the  Missi.  is  system  with  her  ;  if  she  opens  it  now, 
it  will  be  because  forced  by  imperious  circum- 
stances. She  will  consequently  shut  it  again 
when  these  circumstances  cease. 
Treaty  will  be  no  obstacle. 

irregularities,  real  and  pretended,  in  our  navigators, 
will  furnish  colour  enough,  perpetual  broils,  and 
finally  war  will  ensue. 

*  On  this  mission  of  Connolly  see  Gayarre,  History  of  Louisiana 
under  the  Spanish  Domination,  235,  and  Brown,  Political  Begin- 
nings of  Kentucky,  182  , — one  of  the  publications  of  the  Filson  Club, 
and  of  great  value. 


62 

prudence,  and  even  necessity,  imposes  on  us  the  law 
of  settling  the  matter  now,  finally,  and  not  by  halves, 
With  experience  of  the  past,  and  prospect  of  the 
future,  it  W?  be  imbecility  in  us  to  accept  y6  naked 
navigation.  With  that,  we  must  have  what  will  se- 
cure its  continuance  :  that  is,  a  port  near  the  mouth, 
to  receive  our  vessels,  and  protect  the  navigation. 
But  even  this  will  not  secure  the  Floridas  and  Louisiana 
against  Gr.  Brit. 

if  we  are  neutral,  she  will  wrest  those  possessions 
from  Spain. 

the   inhabitants  (French,  English,   Scotch,   Ameri- 
cans) would  prefer  EngH  to  Spain. 
II.  What  then  had  Spain  better  do  of  choice  ? 

Cede  to  us  all  territory  on  our  side  the  Missis- 
sippi. 

on  condition  that  we  guarantee  all  her  poss'n 
on  the  western  waters  of  that  river,  she  agreeing 
further  to  subsidize  us,  if  the  guarantee  brings  us 
into  the  war. 

Should  Gr.  Br.  possess  herself  of  the  Floridas  and  Louisi- 
ana, her  governing  principles  are  Conquest,  Coloni- 
zation, Commerce,  Monopoly. 
She  will  establish  powerful  colonies  in  them, 
these  can  be  poured  into  the  gulph  of  Mexico,  for 
any  sudden  enterprise  there. 

or  invade  Mexico  their  next  neighbor  by  land; 
whilst  a  fleet  co-operates  along  shore,  and  cuts  off 
relief. 

and  proceed  successively  from  colony  to  colony. 
With  respect  to  us,  if  Gr.  Br.  establishes  herself  on  our 
whole  land  board,  our  lot  will  be 


63 

bloody  and  eternal  war 

or  indissoluble  confederacy. 

Which  ought  we  to  choose  ? 

What  will  be  the  lot  of  the  Span,  colonies  in  the  jaws 

of  such  a  confederacy  ? 

What  will  secure  the  Ocean  against  Monopoly? 
Safer  for  Spain  that  we  should   be  her  neighbor,  than 

England. 

Conquest  not  in  our  principles :   inconsistent  with 

our  govm't. 

Not  our  interest  to  cross  the  Mississippi  for  ages, 

And  will  never  be  our  interest  to  remain  united  with 

those  who  do. 

Intermediate  chances  save  the  trouble  of  calculating 

so  far  forward. 
Consequences  of  this  cession,  and  guarantee. 

1.  Every  subject  of  difference  will  be  removed  from 
between  Spain  and  the  U.  S. 

2.  Our  interest  w!f  be  strongly  engaged  in  her  retain- 
ing her  American  possessions. 

3.  Spain  will  be  quieted  as  to  Louisiana  and  her  ter- 
ritories west  of  that. 

4.  She  may  employ  her  whole  force  in  defence  of 
her  islands  and  Southern  possessions. 

5.  If  we  preserve  our  neutrality,  it  will  be  a  very 
partial  one  to  her. 

6.  If  we  are  forced  into  the  war,  it  will  be,  as  we 
wish,  on  the  side  of  the  H.  of  Bourbon. 

7.  Our  privateers  will  commit  formidable  depred'n 
on  y«  Brit,  trade,  and  occupy  much  of  their  force. 

8.  By  withold'g  supplies  of  provision,  as  well  as  by- 


64 

concurring  in  exped'ns,  y?  Brit  isl<?s  will  be  in  im- 
minent danger. 

9.  Their  expences  of  precaution,  both  for  their  con- 
tinental and  insular  poss'ns  will  be  so  augmented, 
as  to  give  a  hope  of  running  their  credit  down. 

In  fine,  for  a  narrow  strip  of  barren,  detached, 
and  expensive  country,  Spain  secures  the  rest  of 
her  territory,  and  makes  an  ally  where  she  might 
have  a  dangerous  enemy.* 

*  These  heads  are  in  Jefferson's  MS.,  but  differ  somewhat  from  those 
printed  in  his  Works,  ix,  412. 


HEADS  OF  CONSIDERATION  ON  THE  CONDUCT  WE  ARE 
TO  OBSERVE  IN  THE  WAR  BETWEEN  SPAIN  AND  GR. 
BRITAIN,  AND  PARTICULARLY  SHOULD  THE  LATTER 
ATTEMPT  THE  CONQUEST  OF  LOUISIANA  AND  THE 
FLORIDAS. 

[12  July,  1790.] 
The  danger  to  us  sh<?  G.  B.  possess  herself  of  Louisiana 

and  the  Floridas. 

Beyond  the  Missi.  a  territory  equal  to  half  ours. 
She  would  seduce  our  Cis-Missi.  possessions. 

Because  N.  Orleans  will  draw  to  it  the  dependence 
of  all  those  waters. 

By  her  language,  laws,   religion,  manners,  goven?, 
commerce,  capitals. 

By  the  markets  she  can  offer  them  in  the  gulph  of 
Mexico. 

She  would  then  have  a  territory  the  double  of  ours. 
She   would   take   away   the   markets  of  the  Atlantic 
States, 

By  furnishing  the  same  articles  cheaper,  tob?,  rice, 
indigo,  bread,  lumber,  fur. 

She   would   encircle   us    completely,  her   possessions 
forming  a  line  on  our  land  boards,  her  fleets  on  our 
sea  board.     Instead  of  two  neighbors  balancing  each 
other,  we  should  have  one  with  y6  strength  of  both. 
Would  the  prevention  of  this  be  worth  a  War? 
Consider  our  abilities  to  make  a  war. 
Our  operations  would  be  by  land  only. 
How  many  men  would  it  need  to  employ? — their 

cost? 

(65) 


66 

Our  resources  by  taxation  and  credit  equal  to  this. 

Weigh  the  evil  of  this  new  accumulation  of  debt. 

Against  the  loss  of  market  and  eternal  danger  and 

expence  of  such  a  neighbor. 
But  no  need  to  take  a  part  as  yet.    We  may  choose  our 

own  time  for  that. 
Delay  gives  us  many  chances  to  avoid  it  altogether. 

They  may  not  single  out  that  object. 

They  may  fail  in  it. 

France  and  Spain  may  recover  it. 
The  difference  between  preventing  and  retaking, 

overbal6?  by  benefits  of  delay. 

Enables  us  to  be  better  prepared. 

To  stipulate  with  Spain  and  France  advantages  for 

our  assistance. 
Suppose  these  our  ultimate  views,  what  is  to  be  done  at 

this  time? 

1.  As  to  Spain. 

If  she  be  as  sensible  as  we  are,  that  she  cannot  save 
Louisiana  and  the  Floridas,  might  she  not  prefer 
their  Independc?  to  their  Subject1?  to  Gr.  Br.  ? 
Can  we  not  take  advantage  of  C*  D'Estaing's  pro- 
pos'n  to  communicate  thro'  the  court  of  France  our 
ideas  on  this  subject  and  our  readiness  to  join  them 
in  guarantee  ? 

This  might  save  us  from  a  war,  if  Gr.  Br.  respects 
our  weight  in  a  war.  If  she  does  not,  it  would  place 
the  war  on  popular  ground. 

2.  As  to  England,  say  to  B.[eckwith]  : — 

That  as  to  a  treaty  of  commerce  we  h<?  never  de- 
sired it  but  on  terms  of  perfect  reciprocity. 


67 

That  therefore  we  never  thought  to  give  any  price  for 
it  but  itself. 

That  we  had  wished  for  it  to  avoid  giving  mutual 
bounds  to  the  commerce  of  both  nations. 
But  that  we  have  the  measures  in  our  own  power 
which  may  save  us  from  loss. 

That  as  to  the  alliance  they  propose,  it  would  in- 
volve us  against  France  and  Spain. 
And  considered  even  in  a  moral  view,  no  price  could 
repay  such  an  abandonm1.  of  character. 
That  we  are  truly  disposed  to  remain  strictly  neutral. 
Tho'  we  must  confess  yl.  we  sh"?  view  in  a  very  ser- 
ious light  attempts  to  extend  themselves  along  our 
frontier,  and  destroy  all  balance  in  our  neighborhood. 
[The  latter  sentiment  it  might  be  advantageous  to  express, 
because  if  there  be  any  difference  of  op'n  in  her 
councils  whether  to  bend  their  force  agl.  North  or 
South  America  (and  certainly  there  is  room  for  dif- 
ference) and  if  these  operations  be  nearly  balanced, 
the  possibility  of  drawing  an  enemy  the  more  on 
themselves,  might  determine  the  balance.]* 

*  A  single  sheet  in  Jefferson's  MS.,  undated  and  without  signature. 
It  is  the  first  draft  of  a  paper  drawn  up  by  Jefferson  as  the  basis  of  a 
reply  to  the  mission  of  George  Beckwith,  some  particulars  of  which  are 
given  in  a  note  to  the  opinion  of  Hamilton,  in  the  pages  following.  The 
paper  as  completed  is  printed,  with  errors,  in  the  Works  of  Jefferson^ 
ix,  409,  and  differs  in  many  details  from  this  draft 


HAMILTON   TO  WASHINGTON. 

NEW- YORK,  Sept.  15,  1790. 

The  urgent  avocations  in  which  I  have  been  en- 
gaged, towards  putting  in  a  train  of  execution  the  laws 
of  the  last  session  affecting  my  department,  and  a  de- 
sire of  reflecting  maturely,  and  giving  the  reasons  for 
the  result  of  my  reflections  fully,  have  caused  me  to 
delay  longer  than  I  wished  the  answer  to  the  questions 
with  which  you  honored  me,  and  I  hope  will  excuse 
the  delay. 

The  judgments  formed,  in  particular  cases,  are  al- 
most always  connected  with  a  general  train  of  ideas  in 
respect  to  some  more  comprehensive  principles  or  re- 
lations ;  and  I  had  thought  it  advisable  to  lay  that  train 
before  you,  for  the  better  explanation  of  the  grounds 
of  the  opinions  I  now  give,  or  may  hereafter  have  oc- 
casion to  give,  on  the  like  subjects,  in  obedience  to 
your  commands. 

I  feel  no  small  regret  in  troubling  you  with  the 
perusal  of  so  voluminous  a  discussion ;  but  as  I  thought 
it  would  be  satisfactory  to  you  to  have  the  reasons  of 
the  opinions  you  required  fully  submitted  to  your 
consideration,  I  conceived  it  to  be  more  consistent 
with  my  duty  to  risk  some  intrusion  on  your  time, 
than  to  withhold  any  consideration  that  appeared  to 
me  of  weight  enough  to  enter  into  the  determination. 

Tht  President  of  the  United  States. 
(68) 


OPINION  OF   THE   SECRETARY   OF  THE  TREASURY. 

NEW- YORK,  Sept.  15,  1790. 

Answer  to  Questions  proposed  by  the  President  of  the 
United  Stales  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury. 

QUESTION  THE  FIRST.— "What  should  be  the  answer 
of  the  Executive  of  the  United  States  to  Lord  Dor- 
chester, in  case  he  should  apply  for  permission  to 
march  troops  through  the  territory  of  said  States,  from 
Detroit  to  the  Mississippi  ?" 

ANSWER. — In  order  to  a  right  judgment  of  what 
ought  to  be  done  in  such  case,  it  may  be  of  use  pre- 
viously to  consider  the  following  points  : 

First. — Whether  there  be  a  right  to  refuse  or  con- 
sent, as  shall  be  thought  most  for  the  interest  of  the 
United  States. 

Secondly. — The  consequences  to  be  expected  from 
refusal  or  consent. 

Thirdly. — The  motives  to  the  one  or  to  the  other. 

As  to  the  first  point,  if  it  were  to  be  determined 
upon  principle  only,  without  regard  to  precedents  or 
opinions,  there  would  seem  to  be  no  room  for  hesita- 
tion about  the  right  to  refuse.  The  exclusive  juris- 
diction which  every  independent  nation  has  over  its 
own  territory,  appears  to  involve  in  it  the  right  of  pro- 
hibiting to  all  others  the  use  of  that  territory  in  any 

o 

way  disagreeable  to  itself,  and  more  especially  for  any 

(69) 


yo 

purpose  of  war,  which  always  implies  a  degree  of 
danger  and  inconvenience,  with  the  exception  only  of 
cases  of  necessity. 

And  if  the  United  States  were  in  a  condition  to  do 
it  without  material  hazard,  there  would  be  strong  in- 
ducements to  their  adopting  it  as  a  general  rule  never 
to  grant  a  passage  for  a  voluntary  expedition  of  one 
power  against  another,  unless  obliged  to  it  by  treaty. 

But  the  present  situation  of  the  United  States  is  too 
little  favorable  to  encountering  hazards,  to  authorize 
attempts  to  establish  rules,  however  eligible  in  them- 
selves, which  are  repugnant  to  the  received  maxims 
or  usages  of  nations. 

It  is  therefore  necessary  to  inquire  what  those  max- 
ims or  usages  enjoin  in  the  case  suggested. 

With  regard  to  usage,  it  has  been  far  from  uniform. 
There  are  various  instances,  in  ancient  and  modern 
times  of  similar  permissions  being  demanded — many, 
in  which  they  have  been  granted;  others  in  which 
they  have  been  refused,  and  the  refusal  acquiesced  in ; 
but  perhaps  more  in  which,  when  refused,  a  passage 
has  been  forced,  and  the  doing  of  it  has  often  been 
deemed  justifiable. 

Opinions  are  not  more  harmonious.  Among  those 
who  maybe  considered  as  authorities  on  such  subjects, 
Puffendorf  and  Barbeyrac  confine  within  narrow  limits 
the  right  of  passage  through  neutral  territories ;  while 
Grotius  and  Vattel,  particularly  the  former,  allow  to  it 
greater  latitude.  Puffendorf  treats  it  not  as  a  natural 


right,  but  as  derived  from  compact  or  concession; 
especially  when  the  enemy  of  a  neighboring  state  de- 
sires leave  to  march  troops  through  a  neutral  country 
against  its  neighbor.  For  it  seems  (says  he)  to  be  a 
part  of  the  duty  which  we  owe  to  our  neighbors,  espe- 
cially such  as  have  been  kind  and  friendly,  not  to  suffer 
any  hostile  power  to  march  through  our  country  to 
their  prejudice,  provided  we  can  hinder  the  design  with 
no  great  inconvenience  to  ourselves.  And  as  it  may 
have  a  tendency  to.  make  our  own  country  the  theatre 
of  the  war  (since  the  power  intended  to  be  attacked 
may  justifiably  march  within  our  limits  to  meet  the 
approaching  enemy),  he  concludes  that  it  is  the  safest 
way  of  acting  in  such  case,  if  we  can  do  it  without  any 
considerable  prejudice  to  our  own  affairs,  to  deny  the 
enemy  passage,  and  actually  to  oppose  him  if  he  en- 
deavors to  force  it  without  our  consent.  But  if  we 
are  either  too  weak  to  hinder  his  progress,  or  must  on 
this  score  engage  in  a  dangerous  war,  he  admits  that 
the  plea  of  necessity  will  fairly  justify  us  to  our 
neighbor. 

Examples,  he  adds,  have  little  force  on  the  decision 
of  the  question.  For,  generally,  as  people  have  been 
stronger  or  weaker,  they  have  required  passage  with 
modesty  or  with  confidence,  and  have  in  like  manner 
granted  or  refused  it  to  others.* 

Barbeyrac,  in  his  Commentary  on  Grotius,  is  still 

*  Puffendorf  s  Laws  of  Nature  and  Nations,  pages  239,  240. 


72 

stronger  against  the  right  of  passage.*  He  affirms 
that,  even  though  we  have  nothing  to  apprehend  from 
those  who  desire  a  passage,  we  are  not  therefore 
obliged  in  rigor  to  grant  it.  It  necessarily  follows, 
says  he,  from  the  right  of  property,  that  the  proprietor 
may  refuse  another  the  use  of  his  goods.  Humanity, 
indeed,  requires  that  he  should  grant  that  use  to  those 
who  stand  in  need  of  it,  when  it  can  be  done  without 
any  considerable  inconvenience  to  himself;  but  if  he 
even  then  refuses  it,  though  he  transgresses  his  duty, 
he  does  no  wrong,  properly  so  called,  except  they  are 
in  extreme  necessity,  which  is  superior  to  all  ordinary 
rules.  Thus  far,  and  no  further,  extends  the  reserve 
with  which  it  is  supposed  the  establishment  of  prop- 
erty is  accompanied. 

Grotius,  on  the  other  hand,  expresses  himself  thus  :  f 
A  free  passage  ought  to  be  granted  to  persons  where 
just  occasion  shall  require,  over  any  lands,  or  rivers, 
or  such  parts  of  the  sea  as  belong  to  any  nation ;  and, 
after  enumerating  several  examples  in  support  of  his 
position,  he  concludes  that  the  middle  opinion  is  best; 
to  wit,  that  the  liberty  of  passing  ought  first  to  be  de- 
manded, and  if  denied,  may  be  claimed  by  force. 
Neither,  says  he,  can  it  be  reasonably  objected  that 
there  may  be  suspicion  of  danger  from  the  passing  of 
a  multitude ;  for  one  man's  right  is  not  diminished  by 

*  Note  I  on  Book  II.,  Chap.  III.,  §  xiii. 

f  Rights  of  War  and  Peace,  Book  II.,  Chap.  II.,  §  xiii.,  Nos.  I,  2,  3, 4. 


.     73 

another  man's  fear.  Nor  is  the  fear  of  provoking  that 
prince  against  whom  he  that  desires  to  pass  is  engaged 
in  a  just  war,  a  sufficient  reason  for  refusing  him  pass- 
age. Nor  is  it  any  more  an  excuse  that  he  may  pass 
another  way,  for  this  is  what  every  body  may  equally 
allege,  and  so  this  right  by  passing  would  be  entirely 
destroyed.  But  it  is  enough  that  the  passage  be  re- 
quested, without  any  fraud  or  ill  design,  by  the  nearest 
and  most  convenient  way.  If,  indeed,  he  who  desires 
to  pass  undertakes  an  unjust  war,  or  if  he  brings  peo- 
ple who  are  my  enemies  along  with  him,  I  may  deny 
him  a  passage  ;  for  in  this  case  I  have  a  right  to  meet 
and  oppose  him,  even  in  his  own  land,  and  to  inter- 
cept his  march.  Thus  it  would  seem  to  be  the  opin- 
ion of  Grotius,  that  a  party  engaged  in  a  just  war  has 
a  right,  of  course,  to  a  passage  through  a  neutral  ter- 
ritory, which  can  scarcely,  if  at  all,  be  denied  him, 
even  on  the  score  of  danger  or  inconvenience  to  the 
party  required  to  grant  it. 

But  Vattel,  perhaps  the  most  accurate  and  approved 
of  the  writers  on  the  laws  of  nations,  preserves  a  mean 
between  these*  different  opinions.  This  is  the  sum 
of  what  he  advances:  That  an  innocent  passage  is 
due  to  all  nations  with  whom  a  state  is  at  peace,  for 
troops  equally  with  individuals,  and  to  annoy  as  well 
as  to  avoid  an  enemy.  That  the  party  asking  and  the 
party  asked  are  both,  in  different  degrees,  judges  of 

*  Book  III.,  Chap.  VII.,  §§  119,  120.  I2I«  I22i  I23- 
6 


74 

the  question  when  innocent?  That  where  the  party 
asked  has  good  reasons  for  refusing,  he  is  not  under 
any  obligation  to  grant,  and  in  doubtful  cases  his  judg- 
ment ought  to  be  definitive ;  but  in  evident  ones,  or 
those  in  which  the  harmlessness  of  the  passage  is 
manifest,  the  party  asking  may,  in  the  last  resort,  judge 
for  himself,  and  after  demand  and  refitsal  may  force 
his  way.  That  nevertheless,  as  it  is  very  difficult  for 
the  passage  of  a  powerful  army  to  be  absolutely  inno- 
cent, and  still  more  difficult  for  its  innocence  to  be 
apparent,  a  refusal  ought  to  be  submitted  to,  except  in 
those  very  rare  cases  when  it  can  be  shown  in  the  most 
palpable  manner  that  the  passage  required  is  abso- 
lutely without  danger  or  inconvenience.  And  lastly, 
that  this  right  of  passage  is  only  due  in  a  war  not 
materially  unjust. 

Perhaps  the  only  inference  to  be  drawn  from  all  this 
is,  that  there  exists  in  the  practice  of  nations  and  the 
dogmas  of  political  writers  a  certain  vague  pretension 
to  a  right  of  passage  in  particular  cases,  and  accord- 
ing to  circumstances,  which  is  sufficient  to  afford  to 
the  strong  a  pretext  for  claiming  and  exercising  it 
when  it  suits  their  interests,  and  to  render  it  always 
dangerous  to  the  weak  to  refuse,  and  sometimes  not 
less  so  to  grant  it. 

It  is,  nevertheless,  a  proper  inquiry,  whether  a  re- 
fusal could  be  placed  on  such  ground  as  would  give  a 
reasonable  cause  of  umbrage  to  the  party  refused,  and 
as  in  the  eye  of  the  world  would  justify  it. 


75 

Against  the  propriety  of  a  refusal  are  the  following 
circumstances :  That  there  is  no  connection  between 
us  and  Spain,  which  obliges  us  to  it.  That  the  pas- 
sage asked  will  be  down  rivers,  and  for  the  most  part 
through  an  uninhabited  wilderness,  whence  no  injury 
to  our  citizens  or  settlements  will  be  apprehended : 
and  that  the  number  of  troops  to  be  marched,  espe- 
cially considering  the  route,  will  probably  not  be  such, 
as  on  their  own  account,  to  be  a  serious  cause  of  alarm. 
These  circumstances  may  give  our  refusal  the  com- 
plexion of  partiality  to  Spain,  and  of  indisposition 
towards  Britain,  which  may  be  represented  as  a  devia- 
tion from  the  spirit  of  exact  neutrality. 

In  support  of  the  propriety  of  a  refusal,  the  follow- 
ing is  the  only  assignable  reason ;  that  it  is  safer  for 
us  to  have  two  powerful,  but  rival  nations,  bordering 
upon  our  two  extremities,  than  to  have  one  powerful 
nation  pressing  us  on  both  sides,  and  in  capacity,  here- 
after, by  posts  and  settlements,  to  envelop  our  whole 
interior  frontier. 

The  good  offices  of  Spain  in  the  late  war ;  the  dan- 
ger of  the  seduction  of  our  western  inhabitants ;  the 
probable  consequences  to  the  trade  of  the  Atlantic 
States,  are  considerations  rather  to  be  contemplated  as 
motives,  than  alleged  as  reasons. 

The  first  reason,  however,  is  of  a  nature  to  satisfy 
the  mind  of  the  justice  of  a  refusal;  admitting  the 
authority  of  the  more  moderate  opinions,  which  have 
been  cited.  And  the  danger,  too,  upon  the  supposi- 


76 

tion  of  which  it  is  founded,  appears  to  be  obvious 
enough  to  vindicate  it,  in  the  opinion  of  the  disinter- 
ested part  of  mankind ;  little  likely  as  it  may  be  to 
engage  the  acquiescence  of  the  party  whose  wishes 
would  be  thwarted  by  the  refusal.  It  deserves,  not- 
withstanding, to  be  noticed  on  this  point,  that  the 
ground  of  dissent  would  not  result  from  the  thing 
itself — that  is,  the  mere  passage — but  from  the  nature 
of  the  acquisition,  to  which  it  would  give  facility. 
This  circumstance  may  somewhat  obscure  the  clear- 
ness of  the  conclusion,  that  there  is  a  perfect  right  to 
refuse. 

But  upon  the  whole,  there  does  not  appear  to  be 
room  enough  for  a  scruple  about  the  right,  to  deter 
from  refusal,  if  upon  examination  it  shall  be  found 
expedient. 

Does  the  right  of  consenting  to  the  passage  stand 
upon  ground  equally  unexceptionable  ? 

This  question  Vattel  answers  in  the  following  man- 
ner :  *  "  When  I  have  no  reason  to  refuse  the  passage, 
the  party  against  whom  it  is  granted  has  no  room  for 
complaint,  much  less  for  making  it  a  pretence  for  war ; 
since  I  did  no  more  than  what  the  law  of  nations  en- 
joins. Neither  has  he  any  right  to  require  that  I 
should  deny  the  passage,  because  he  is  not  to  hinder 
me  from  doing  what  I  think  is  agreeable  to  my  duty, 
and  even  on  occasion  when  I  might  with  justice  deny 

*  Vattel,  Book  III.,  Chap,  vii.,  Section  127. 


77 

the  passage,  it  is  allvivable  in  me  not  to  make  uscoimy 
right ;  especially  when  I  should  be  obliged  to  support 
my  refusal  by  my  stvord.  Who  will  take  upon  him  to 
complain  of  my  having  permitted  the  war  to  be  car- 
ried into  his  own  country,  rather  than  draw  it  on  my- 
self? It  cannot  be  expected  that  I  should  take  up 
arms  in  his  favor,  unless  obliged  to  it  by  a  treaty." 
And  Puffendorf  admits,  as  has  been  before  noted,  that 
if  we  are  either  too  weak  to  hinder  his  progress,  or 
must  on  that  score  engage  in  a  dangerous  war,  the 
plea  of  necessity  will  fairly  justify  us  to  our  neighbor. 

Nothing  need  be  added  to  reasoning  so  perspicuous 
and  convincing.  It  does  not  admit  of  a  moment's 
doubt,  as  a  general  rule,  that  a  neutral  state,  unfettered 
by  any  stipulation,  is  not  bound  to  expose  itself  to  a 
war,  merely  to  shelter  a  neighbor  from  the  approaches 
of  its  enemy.  It  remains  to  examine,  if  there  are  any 
circumstances,  in  our  particular  case,  capable  of  form- 
ing an  exception  to  that  rule. 

It  is  not  to  be  forgotten  that  we  received  from 
France,  in  our  late  revolution,  essential  succor,  and 
from  Spain  valuable  countenance,  and  some  direct  aid. 
It  is  also  to  be  remembered,  that  France  is  the  inti- 
mate ally  of  Spain,  and  there  subsists  a  connection  by 
treaty  between  the  former  power  and  the  United 
States. 

It  might  thence  be  alleged  that  obligations  of  grati- 
tude towards  these  powers  require  that  we  should  run 
some  risk,  rather  than  concur  in  a  thing  prejudical  to 


78 

either  of  them,  and  particularly  in  favor  of  that  very 
nation  against  which  they  assisted  us.  And  the  nat- 
ural impulse  of  every  good  heart  will  second  the 
proposition,  till  reason  has  taught  it  that  refinements 
of  this  kind  are  to  be  indulged  with  caution  in  the 
affairs  of  nations. 

Gratitude  is  a  word,  the  very  sound  of  which  im- 
poses something  like  respect.  Where  there  is  even  an 
appearance  upon  which  the  claim  to  it  can  be  founded, 
it  can  seldom  be  a  pleasing  task  to  dispute  that  claim. 
But  where  a  word  may  become  the  basis  of  a  political 
system,  affecting  the  essential  interests  of  the  state,  it 
is  incumbent  upon  those  who  have  any  concern  in  the 
public  administration,  to  appreciate  its  true  import  and 
application. 

It  is  necessary,  then,  to  reflect,  however  painful  the 
reflection,  that  gratitude  is  a  duty,  a  sentiment,  which 
between  nations  can  rarely  have  any  solid  foundation. 
Gratitude  is  only  due  to  a  kindness  or  service,  the 
predominant  object  of  which  is  the  interest  or  benefit 
of  the  party  to  whom  it  is  performed.  Where  the 
interest  or  benefit  of  the  party  performing  is  the  pre- 
dominant cause  of  it,  however  there  may  result  a  debt, 
in  cases  in  which  there  is  not  an  immediate  adequate 
and  reciprocal  advantage,  there  can  be  no  room  for  the 
sentiment  of  gratitude.  Where  there  is  such  an  ad- 
vantage, there  is  then  not  even  a  debt.  If  the  motive 
to  the  act,  instead  of  being  the  benefit  of  the  party  to 
whom  it  is  done,  should  be  a  compound  of  the  inter- 


79 

est  of  the  party  doing  it  and  of  detriment  to  some 
other,  of  whom  he  is  the  enemy  and  the  rival,  there  is 
still  less  room  for  so  noble  and  refined  a  sentiment. 
This  analysis  will  serve  as  a  test  of  our  true  situation, 
in  regard  both  to  France  and  Spain. 

It  is  not  to  be  doubted,  that  the  part  which  the 
courts  of  France  and  Spain  took  in  our  quarrel  with 
Great  Britain,  is  to  be  attributed,  not  to  an  attachment 
to  our  independence  or  liberty,  but  to  a  desire  of  di- 
minishing the  power  of  Great  Britain  by  severing  the 
British  Empire.  This  they  considered  as  an  interest 
of  very  great  magnitude  to  them.  In  this  their  calcu- 
lations and  their  passions  conspired.  For  this,  they 
united  their  arms  with  ours,  and  encountered  the  ex- 
penses and  perils  of  war.  This  has  been  accom- 
plished ;  the  advantages  of  it  are  mutual ;  and  so  far 
the  account  is  balanced. 

In  the  progress  of  the  war  *  they  lent  us  money,  as 
necessary  to  its  success,  and  during  our  inability  to 
pay  they  have  forborne  to  press  us  for  it.  The  money 
we  ought  to  exert  ourselves  to  repay  with  interest, 
and  as  well  for  the  loan  of  it,  as  for  the  forbearance  to 
urge  the  repayment  of  the  sums  which  have  become 
due,  we  ought  always  to  be  ready  to  make  propor- 
tionate acknowledgments,  and  when  opportunities 
shall  offer,  returns  answerable  to  the  nature  of  the 
service. 

*  France  has  made  us  one  loan  since  the  peace. 


8o 

Let  it  be  added  to  this,  that  the  conduct  of  France 
in  the  manner  of  affording  her  aid,  bore  the  marks  of 
a  liberal  policy.  She  did  not  endeavor  to  extort  from 
us,  as  the  price  of  it,  any  disadvantageous  or  humili- 
ating concessions.  In  this  respect,  however,  she  may 
have  been  influenced  by  an  enlightened  view  of  her 
own  interest.  She  entitled  herself  to  our  esteem  and 
good  will.  These  dispositions  towards  her  ought  to 
be  cherished  and  cultivated  ;  but  they  are  very  distinct 
from  a  spirit  of  romantic  gratitude,  calling  for  sacri- 
fices of  our  substantial  interests,  preferences  incon- 
sistent with  sound  policy,  or  complaisances  incompat- 
ible with  our  safety. 

The  conduct  of  Spain  towards  us  presents  a  picture 
far  less  favorable.  The  direct  aid  we  received  from 
her  during  the  war  was  inconsiderable  in  itself,  and 
still  more  inconsiderable  compared  with  her  faculty  of 
aiding  us.  She  refrained  from  acknowledging  our 
independence;  has  never  acceded  to  the  treaty  of 
commerce  made  with  France,  though  a  right  of  doing 
it  was  reserved  to  her,  nor  made  any  other  treaty  with 
us;  she  has  maintained  possessions  within  our  ac- 
knowledged limits  without  our  consent ;  she  persever- 
ingly  obstructs  our  sharing  in  the  navigation  of  the 
Mississippi,  though  it  is  a  privilege  essential  to  us,  and 
to  which  we  consider  ourselves  as  having  an  indisput- 
able title.  And  perhaps  it  might  be  added  upon  good 
ground,  that  she  has  not  scrupled  to  intrigue  with 
leading  individuals  in  the  western  country,  to  seduce 


8i 

them  from  our  interests,  and  to  attach  them  to  her 
own. 

Spain  therefore  must  be  regarded,  upon  the  whole, 
as  having  slender  claims  to  peculiar  good  will  from  us. 
There  is  certainly  nothing  that  authorizes  her  to  ex- 
pect we  should  expose  ourselves  to  any  extraordinary 
jeopardy  for  her  sake.  And  to  conceive  that  any  con- 
siderations relative  to  France  ought  to  be  extended  to 
her,  would  be  to  set  up  a  doctrine  altogether  new  in 
politics.  The  ally  of  our  ally- has  no  claim,  as  such, 
to  our  friendship.  We  may  have  substantial  grounds 
of  dissatisfaction  against  him,  and  act  in  consequence 
of  them,  even  to  open  hostility,  without  derogating  in 
any  degree  from  what  we  owe  to  our  ally. 

This  is  so  true,  that  if  a  war  should  really  ensue  be- 
tween Great  Britain  and  Spain,  and  if  the  latter  should 
persist  in  excluding  us  from  the  Mississippi  (taking  it 
for  granted  our  claim  to  share  in  its  navigation  is  well 
founded),  there  can  be  no  reasonable  ground  of  doubt 
that  we  should  be  at  liberty,  if  we  thought  it  our  in- 
terest, consistently  with  our  present  engagements  with 
France,  to  join  Britain  against  Spain. 

How  far  it  might  be  expedient  to  place  ourselves  in 
a  situation  which,  in  case  France  should  eventually 
become  a  party  in  the  war,  might  entangle  us  in  oppo- 
site duties  on  the  score  of  the  stipulated  guarantee  of 
her  West  India  possessions,  or  might  have  a  tendency 
to  embroil  us  with  her,  would  be  a  mere  question  of 
prudential  and  liberal  calculation,  which  would  have 


82 

nothing  to  do  with  the  right  of  taking  side  against 
Spain. 

These  are  truths  necessary  to  be  contemplated  with 
freedom,  because  it  is  impossible  to  foresee  what  events 
may  spring  up,  or  whither  our  interests  may  point ; 
and  it  is  very  important  to  distinguish  with  accuracy 
how  far  we  are  bound,  and  where  we  are  free. 

However  vague  the  obligations  of  gratitude  may  be 
between  nations,  those  of  good  faith  are  precise  and 
determinate.  Within  their  true  limits,  they  can  hardly 
be  held  too  sacred.  But  by  exaggerating  them,  or 
giving  them  a  fanciful  extension,  they  would  be  in 
danger  of  losing  their  just  force.  This  would  be  con- 
verting them  into  fetters,  which  a  nation  would  ere  long 
be  impatient  to  break,  as  consistent  neither  with  its 
prosperity  nor  its  safety.  Hence,  while  it  is  desirable 
to  maintain  with  fidelity  our  engagements  to  France, 
it  is  advisable,  on  all  occasions,  to  be  aware  that  they 
oblige  us  to  nothing  towards  Spain. 

From  this  view  of  the  subject,  there  does  not  appear 
any  circumstance  in  our  case  capable  of  forming  an 
exception  to  the  general  rule ;  and,  as  it  is  certain  that 
there  can  hardly  be  a  situation  less  adapted  to  war 
than  that  in  which  we  now  find  ourselves,  we  can,  with 
the  greatest  sincerity,  offer  the  most  satisfactory  ex- 
cuse to  Spain  for  not  withholding  our  consent,  if  our 
own  interests  do  not  decide  us  to  a  contrary  course. 

The  conclusion  from  what  has  been  said  is,  that 
there  is  a  right  either  to  refuse  or  consent,  as  shall  be 


83 

judged  for  the  interest  of  the  United  States;  though 
the  right  to  consent  is  less  questionable  than  the  right 
to  refuse. 

The  consequences  to  be  expected  from  refusal  or 
consent  present  themselves  next  to  consideration. 
Those  of  consent  shall  be  first  examined. 

An  increase  of  the  means  of  annoying  us  in  the 
same  hands  is  a  certain  ill  consequence  of  the  acquisi- 
tion of  the  Floridas  and  Louisiana  by  the  British. 
This  will  result  not  only  from  contiguity  to  a  greater 
part  of  our  territory,  but  from  the  increased  facility  of 
acquiring  an  undivided  influence  over  all  the  Indian 
tribes  inhabiting  within  the  borders  of  the  United 
States. 

Additional  danger  of  the  dismemberment  of  the 
western  country  is  another  ill  consequence  to  be  ap- 
prehended from  that  acquisition.  This  will  arise  as 
well  from  the  greater  power  of  annoying  us,  as  from 
the  greater  power  which  it  is  likely  would  be  pursued 
by  that  nation,  if  in  possession  of  the  key  to  the  only 
outlet  for  the  productions  of  that  country.  Instead  of 
shutting,  they  would  probably  open  the  door  to  its  in- 
habitants, and  by  conciliating  their  good  will  on  the 
one  hand,  and  making  them  sensible  on  the  other  of 
their  dependence  on  them  for  the  continuance  of  so 
essential  an  advantage,  they  might  hold  out  to  them 
the  most  powerful  temptation  to  a  desertion  of  their 
connection  with  the  rest  of  the  United  States.  The 
avarice  and  ambition  of  individuals  may  be  made  to 
co-operate  in  favor  of  those  views. 


84 

A  third  ill  consequence  of  that  acquisition  would 
be,  material  injury,  in  time  to  come,  to  the  commerce 
of  the  Atlantic  States.  By  rendering  New  Orleans 
the  emporium  of  the  products  of  the  western  country, 
Britain  would,  at  a  period  not  very  distant,  have  little 
occasion  for  supplies  of  provisions  for  their  islands 
from  the  Atlantic  States ;  and  for  their  European  mar- 
ket they  would '  derive  from  the  same  source  copious 
supplies  of  tobacco  and  other  articles  now  furnished 
by  the  Southern  States :  whence  a  great  diminution 
of  the  motives  to  establish  liberal  terms  of  commercial 
intercourse  with  the  United  States  collectively. 

These  consequences  are  all  expressed  or  implied  in 
the  form  of  the  question  stated  by  the  President.  And 
as  far  as  our  consent  can  be  supposed  likely  to  have 
influence  upon  the  event,  they  constitute  powerful 
objections  to  giving  it. 

If  even  it  should  be  taken  for  granted  that  our  con- 
sent or  refusal  would  have  no  influence  either  way,  it 
would  not  even  then  cease  to  be  disagreeable  to  con- 
cur in  a  thing  apparently  so  inauspicious  to  our  inter- 
ests. And  it  deserves  attention,  that  our  concurrency 
might  expose  us  to  the  imputation  either  of  want  of 
foresight  to  discover  a  danger,  or  of  vigor  to  with- 
stand it. 

But  there  is  almost  always  in  such  cases  a  compari- 
son of  evils;  and  the  point  of  prudence  is,  to  make 
choice  of  that  course  which  threatens  the  fewest  or  the 
least,  or  sometimes  the  least  certain.  The  conse- 


85 

quences  of  refusal  are  therefore  to  be  weighed  against 
those  of  consent. 

It  seems  to  be  a  matter  taken  for  granted  by  the 
writers  upon  the  subject,  that  a  refusal  ought  to  be 
accompanied  with  a  resolution  to  support  it,  if  neces- 
sary, by  the  sword  ;  or  in  other  words,  to  oppose  the 
passage,  if  attempted  to  be  forced,  or  to  resent  the  in- 
jury, if  circumstances  should  not  permit  an  effectual 
opposition.  This,  indeed,  is  implied  in  the  nature  of 
the  thing;  for  to  what  purpose  refuse,  unless  it  be  in- 
tended to  make  good  the  refusal  ?  or  how  avoid  dis- 
grace, if  our  territories  are  suffered  to  be  violated  with 
impunity,  after  a  formal  and  deliberate  prohibition  of 
passage  ? 

There  are  cases  in  which  a  nation  may,  without 
ignominy,  wink  at  an  infraction  of  its  rights;  but  this 
does  not  appear  to  be  one  of  them.  After  having  been 
asked  its  permission  and  having  refused  it,  the  pre- 
sumption will  be  that  it  has  estimated  the  consequences, 
calculated  its  means,  and  is  prepared  to  assert  and  up- 
hold its  rights.  If  the  contrary  of  this  should  turn 
out  to  be  its  conduct,  it  must  bring  itself  into  contempt 
for  inviting  insult  which  it  is  unable  to  repel,  and  man- 
ifesting ill-will  towards  a  power  which  it  durst  not  re- 
sist. As,  on  the  one  hand,  there  cannot  be  conceived 
to  be  a  greater  outrage  than  to  pass  through  our 
country,  in  defiance  of  our  declared  disapprobation; 
so,  on  the  other,  there  cannot  be  a  greater  humiliation 
than  to  submit  to  it. 


86 

The  consequence  therefore  of  refusal,  if  not  effectual, 
must  be  absolute  disgrace  or  immediate  war.  This 
appears,  at  least,  to  be  the  alternative. 

Whether  a  refusal  would  have  the  desired  effect,  is 
at  best  problematical.  The  presumption,  perhaps,  is, 
that  Great  Britain  will  have  adverted  to  the  possibility 
of  it;  and  if,  under  the  uncertainty  of  what  would  be 
our  conduct,  she  should  still  have  resolved  on  prose- 
cuting the  enterprise  through  our  territory,  that  she 
will  at  the  same  time  have  resolved,  either  to  ask  no 
questions,  or  to  disregard  |our  dissent.  It  is  not  un- 
likely that  the  reasoning  of  the  British  cabinet  will 
have  been  to  this  effect : — If  the  United  States  have  no 
predilection  for  Spain,  or  if  their  views  of  their  own 
interest  are  not  opposed  to  the  acquisition  we  medi- 
tate, they  will  not  withhold  their  consent ;  if  either  the 
one  or  the  other  be  the  case,  it  ought  to  be  determined 
beforehand,  whether  their  enmity  be  a  greater  evil, 
than  the  projected  acquisition  a  good;  and  if  we  do 
not  choose  to  renounce  the  one,  we  must  be  prepared 
to  meet  the  other. 

A  further  ill  consequence  of  the  refusal,  if  ineffectual, 
not  wholly  destitute  of  weight,  is  this,  that  Great  Brit- 
ain would  then  think  herself  under  less  obligation  to 
keep  measures  with  us,  and  would  feel  herself  more 
at  liberty  to  employ  every  engine  in  her  power  to 
make  her  acquisition  as  prejudicial  to  us  as  possible ; 
whereas,  if  no  impediment  should  be  thrown  in  the 
way  by  us,  more  good  humor  may  beget  greater 


87 

moderation,  and,  in  the  progress  of  things,  concessions 
securing  us  may  be  made,  as  the  price  of  our  future 
neutrality.  An  explicit  recognition  of  our  right  to 
navigate  the  Mississippi  to  and  from  the  ocean,  with 
the  possession  of  New  Orleans,  would  greatly  mitigate 
the  causes  of  apprehension  from  the  conquest  of  the 
Floridas  by  the  British. 

The  consequences  of  refusal  or  consent  constitute 
leading  motives  to  the  one  or  to  the  other ;  which 
now  claim  a  more  particular  discussion. 

It  has  been  seen  that  the  ill  effects  to  be  appre- 
hended from  the  conquest  of  the  Spanish  territories  in 
our  neighborhood  are,  an  increase  of  the  means 
whereby  we  may  be  hereafter  annoyed,  and  of  the 
danger  of  the  separation  of  the  western  country  from 
the  rest  of  the  Union ;  and  a  future  interference  with 
the  trade  of  the  Atlantic  States,  in  a  manner,  too,  not 
conducive  to  the  general  weal. 

As  far  as  there  is  a  prospect  that  a  refusal  would  be 
an  impediment  to  the  enterprise,  the  considerations 
which  have  been  mentioned  afford  the  strongest  in- 
ducements to  it.  But  if  that  effect  of  it  be  doubtful, 
the  force  of  these  inducements  is  proportionably  dimin- 
ished ;  if  improbable,  it  nearly  ceases.  The  prospect 
in  this  case  would  be,  that  a  refusal  would  aggravate 
instead  of  preventing  the  evil  it  was  intended  to  obvi- 
ate. And  it  must  be  acknowledged  that  the  success 
of  it  is,  at  least,  very  doubtful. 

The  consideration  that  our  assent  may  be  construed 


88 

into  want  of  foresight  or  want  of  vigor,  though  not  to 
be  disregarded,  would  not  be  sufficient  to  justify  our 
risking  a  war  in  our  present  situation.  The  cogent 
reasons  we  have  to  avoid  a  war  are  too  obvious  and 
intelligible,  not  to  furnish  an  explanation  of  and  an 
apology  for  our  conduct  in  this  respect. 

Whatever  may  be  the  calculations  with  regard  to 
the  probable  effect  of  a  refusal,  it  ought  to  be  pre- 
dicated upon  the  supposition  that  it  may  not  be  re- 
garded, and  accompanied  with  a  determination  to  act 
as  a  proper  attention  to  national  dignity  would  in  such 
an  event  dictate.  This  would  be  to  make  war. 

For  it  is  a  sound  maxim,  that  a  state  had  better  haz- 
ard any  calamities  than  submit  tamely  to  absolute 
disgrace. 

Now  it  is  manifest,  that  a  government  scarcely  ever 
had  stronger  motives  to  avoid  war,  than  that  of  the 
United  States  at  the  present  juncture.  They  have 
much  to  dread  from  war ;  much  to  expect  from  peace ; 
something  to  hope  from  negotiation,  in  case  of  a  rup- 
ture between  Britain  and  Spain. 

We  are  but  just  recovering  from  the  effects  of  a  long, 
arduous,  and  exhausting  war.  The  people  but  just 
begin  to  realize  the  sweets  of  repose.  We  are  vul- 
nerable both  by  water  and  land ;  without  either  fleet 
or  army.  We  have  a  considerable  debt  in  proportion 
to  the  resources  which  the  state  of  things  permits  the 
government  to  command.  Measures  have  been  re- 
cently entered  upon  for  the  restoration  of  credit, 


which  a  war  could  hardly  fail  to  disconcert,  and 
which,  if  disturbed,  would  be  fatal  to  the  means  of 
prosecuting  it.  Our  national  government  is  in  its  in- 
fancy. The  habits  and  dispositions  of  our  people  are 
ill  suited  to  those  liberal  contributions  to  the  treasury, 
which  a  war  would  necessarily  exact.  There  are 
causes  which  render  war  in  this  country  more  expen- 
sive, and  consequently  more  difficult  to  be  carried  on, 
than  in  any  other.  There  is  a  general  disinclination 
to  it  in  all  classes.  The  theories  of  the  speculative, 
and  the  feelings  of  all,  are  opposed  to  it.  The  support 
of  public  opinion  (perhaps  more  essential  to  our  gov- 
ernment than  to  any  other)  could  only  be  looked  for 
in  a  war  evidently  resulting  from  necessity. 

These  are  general  reasons  against  going  into  war. 
There  are  others,  of  a  more  particular  kind.  To  the 
people  at  large  the  quarrel  would  be  apt  to  have  the 
appearance  of  having  originated  in  a  desire  of  shield- 
ing Spain  from  the  arms  of  Britain.  There  are  several 
classes  of  men  to  whom  this  idea  would  not  be  agree- 
able, especially  if  the  Dutch  were  understood  to  be  in 
conjunction  with  the  British.  All  those  who  were  not 
friendly  to  our  late  Revolution  would  certainly  dislike 
it.  Most  of  the  descendants  of  the  Dutch  would  be 
unfriendly  to  it.  And  let  it  not  be  overlooked,  that 
there  is  still  a  considerable  proportion  of  those  who 
were  firm  friends  to  the  Revolution,  who  retain  pre- 
possessions in  favor  of  Englishmen,  and  prejudices 
against  Spaniards. 


9o 

In  a  popular  government  especially,  however  pre- 
judices like  these  may  be  regretted,  they  are  not  to  be 
excluded  from  political  calculations. 

It  ought  also  to  be  taken  into  the  account,  that  by 
placing  ourselves  at  this  time  in  a  situation  to  go  to 
war  against  Great  Britain,  we  embark  with  the  weak- 
est party — with  a  total  uncertainty  what  accession  of 
strength  may  be  gained — and  without  making  any 
terms  with  regard  either  to  succor,  indemnity,  or 
compensation. 

France  is  the  only  weight  which  can  be  thrown  into 
the  scale,  capable  of  producing  an  equilibrium.  But 
her  accession,  however  probable,  ought  not  to  be 
deemed  absolutely  certain.  The  predominant  party 
there  may  choose  to  avoid  war  as  dangerous  to  their 
own  power.  And  if  even  obstacles  should  not  arise 
from  that  quarter,  it  cannot  be  foreseen  to  what  ex- 
tent France  will  be  in  condition  to  make  efforts.  The 
great  body  of  malcontents  comprehending  a  large  pro- 
portion of  the  most  wealthy  and  formerly  the  most  in- 
fluential class — the  prodigious  innovations  which  have 
been  made — the  general  and  excessive  fermentation 
which  has  been  excited  in  the  minds  of  the  people — 
the  character  of  the  prince,  or  the  nature  of  the  gov- 
ernment likely  to  be  instituted,  as  far  as  can  be  judged 
prior  to  an  experiment — do  not  prognosticate  much 
order  or  vigor  in  the  affairs  of  that  country  for  a  con- 
siderable period  to  come. 

It  is  possible,  indeed,  that  the  enthusiasm  which  the 


transition  from  slavery  to  liberty  may  inspire,  may  be 
a  substitute  for  the  energy  of  a  good  administration, 
and  the  spring  of  great  exertions.  But  the  ebullitions 
of  enthusiasm  must  ever  be  a  precarious  reliance. 
And  it  is  quite  as  possible  that  the  greatness,  and  per- 
haps immaturity,  of  that  transition,  may  prolong  licen- 
tiousness and  disorder.  Calculations  of  what  may 
happen  in  France  must  be  unusually  fallible,  not 
merely  from  the  yet  unsettled  state  of  things  in  that 
kingdom,  but  from  the  extreme  violence  of  the  change 
which  has  been  wrought  in  the  situation  of  the 
people. 

These  considerations  are  additional  admonitions  to 
avoid,  as  far  as  possible,  any  step  that  may  embroil  us 
with  Great  Britain.  It  seems  evidently  our  true  policy 
to  cultivate  neutrality.  This,  at  least,  is  the  ground 
on  which  we  ought  to  stand,  until  we  can  see  more  of 
the  scene,  and  can  have  secured  the  means  of  chang- 
ing it  with  advantage. 

We  have  objects  which,  in  such  a  conjuncture,  are 
not  to  be  neglected.  The  Western  posts,  on  one  side, 
and  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi,  on  the  other,  call 
for  a  vigilant  attention  to  what  is  going  on.  They  are 
both  of  importance.  The  securing  of  the  latter  may 
be  regarded  in  its  consequence  as  essential  to  the  unity 
of  the  empire. 

But  it  is  not  impossible,  if  war  takes  place,  that  by  a 
judicious  attention  to  favorable  moments,  we  may  ac- 
complish both  by  negotiation.  The  moment,  how- 


92 

ever,  we  became  committed  on  either  side,  the  advan- 
tages of  our  position  for  negotiation  would  be  gone. 
They  would  even  be  gone  in  respect  to  the  party  with 
whom  we  were  in  co-operation  ;  for  being  once  in  the 
war,  we  could  not  make  terms  as  the  condition  of 
entering  it. 

Though  it  may  be  uncertain  how  long  we  shall  be 
permitted  to  preserve  our  neutrality,  that  is  not  a  suffi- 
cient reason  for  departing  from  it  voluntarily.  It  is 
possible  we  may  be  permitted  to  persist  in  it  through- 
out. And  if  we  must  renounce  it,  it  is  better  it  should 
be  from  necessity  than  choice ;  at  least  till  we  see  a 
prospect  of  renouncing  with  safety  and  profit.  If  the 
government  is  forced  into  a  war,  the  cheerful  support  of 
the  people  may  be  counted  upon.  If  it  brings  it  upon 
itself,  it  will  have  to  struggle  with  their  displeasure 
and  reluctance.  The  difference  alone  is  immense. 

The  desire  of  manifesting  amity  to  Spain,  from  the 
supposition  that  our  permanent  interest  is  concerned 
in  cementing  an  intimate  connection  with  France  and 
Spain,  ought  to  have  no  influence  in  the  case.  Ad- 
mitting the  existence  of  such  an  interest,  it  ought  not 
to  hurry  us  into  premature  hazards.  If  it  should 
finally  induce  us  to  become  a  party,  it  will  be  time 
enough  when  France  has  become  such,  and  after  we 
shall  have  adjusted  the  condition  upon  which  we  are 
to  engage. 

But  the  reality  of  such  an  interest  is  a  thing  about 
which  the  best  and  the  ablest  men  of  this  country  are 


93 

far  from  being  agreed.  There  are  of  this  number,  who, 
if  the  United  States  were  at  perfect  liberty,  would  prefer 
an  intimate  connection  between  them  and  Great  Brit- 
ain as  most  conducive  to  their  security  and  advantage ; 
and  who  are  of  opinion  that  it  will  be  well  to  cultivate 
friendship  between  that  country  and  this,  to  the 
utmost  extent  which  is  reconcilable  with  the  faith  of 
existing  engagements  :  while  the  most  general  opin- 
ion is,  that  it  is  our  true  policy,  to  steer  as  clear  as 
possible  of  all  foreign  connection,  other  than  commer- 
cial   *  and  in  this  respect  to  cultivate  intercourse 

with  all  the  world  on  the  broadest  basis  of  reciprocal 
privilege. 

An  attentive  consideration  of  the  vicissitudes  which 
have  attended  the  friendships  of  nations,  except  in  a 
very  few  instances,  from  very  peculiar  circumstances, 
gives  little  countenance  to  systems  which  proceed  on 
the  supposition  of  a  permanent  interest  to  prefer  a  par- 
ticular connection.  The  position  of  the  United  States, 
detached  as  they  are  from  Europe,  admonishes  them 
to  unusual  circumspection  on  that  point.  The  same 
position,  as  far  as  it  has  relation  to  the  possessions  of 
European  powers  in  their  vicinity,  strengthens  the 
admonition. 

Let  it  be  supposed  that  Spain  retains  her  possessions 
on  our  right,  and  persists  in  the  policy  she  has 
hitherto  pursued,  without  the  slightest  symptom  of 

*  In  Mr.  Lodge's  edition  there  is  no  mark  of  omission. 


94 

relaxation,  of  barring  the  Mississippi  against  us;  where 
must  this  end,  and  at  a  period  not  very  distant?  In- 
fallibly in  a  war  with  Spain,  or  separation  of  the  West- 
ern Country.  This  country  must  have  an  outlet  for 
its  commodities.  This  is  essential  to  its  prosperity, 
and  if  not  procured  to  it  by  the  United  States,  must  be 
had  at  the  expense  of  the  connection  with  them.  A 
war  with  Spain,  when  our  affairs  will  have  acquired 
greater  consistency  and  order,  will  certainly  be  to  be 
preferred  to  such  an  alternative.  In  an  event  of  this 
sort,  we  should  naturally  seek  aid  from  Great  Britain. 
This  would  probaby  involve  France  on  the  opposite 
side,  and  effect  a  revolution  in  the  state  of  our  foreign 
politics. 

In  regard  to  the  possessions  of  Great  Britain  on  our 
left,  it  is  at  least  problematical,  whether  the  acquisition 
of  them  will  ever  be  desirable  to  the  United  States. 
It  is  certain  that  they  are  in  no  shape  essential  to  our 
prosperity.  Except,  therefore,  the  detention  of  our 
Western  posts,  (an  object,  too,  of  far  less  consequence 
than  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi,)  there  appears 
no  necessary  source  of  future  collision  with  that  power. 

This  view  of  the  subject  manifests  that  we  may  have 
a  more  urgent  interest  to  differ  with  Spain,  than  with 
Britain.  And  that  conclusion  will  become  the  stronger, 
if  it  be  admitted,  that  when  we  are  able  to  make  good 
our  pretensions,  we  ought  not  to  leave  in  the  possess- 
ion of  any  foreign  power  the  territories  at  the  mouth 
of  the  Mississippi,  which  are  to  be  regarded  as  the 
key  to  it. 


95 

While  considerations  of  this  nature  ought  not  to 
weaken  the  sense  which  our  Government  ought  to 
have  of  any  obligations  which  good  faith  shall  fairly 
impose,  they  ought  to  inspire  caution  in  adopting  a 
system,  which  may  approximate  us  too  nearly  to 
certain  powers,  and  place  us  at  too  great  a  distance 
from  others.  Indeed  every  system  of  this  kind  is  liable 
to  the  objection,  that  it  has  a  tendency  to  give  a  wrong 
bias  to  the  Counsels  of  a  Nation,  and  sometimes  to 
make  its  own  interest  subservient  to  that  of  another. 

If  the  immediate  cause  of  the  impending  war  be- 
tween Britain  and  Spain  be  considered,  there  cannot 
be  drawn  from  thence  any  inducements  for  our  favor- 
ing Spain.  It  is  difficult  to  admit  the  reasonableness 
or  justice  of  the  pretensions  on  her  part,  which  occa- 
sion the  transactions  complained  of  by  Great  Britain, 
and  certainly  the  monopoly,  at  which  these  pretensions 
aim,  is  entitled  to  no  partiality  from  any  maritime  or 
trading  people.  Hence  considerations,  neither  of  jus- 
tice or  policy,  as  they  respect  the  immediate  cause  of 
the  quarrel,  incline  us  towards  Spain. 

Putting,  therefore,  all  considerations  of  peculiar 
good  will  to  Spain  or  of  predilection  to  any  particular 
connection  out  of  the  question,  the  argument  respect- 
ing refusal  or  consent,  in  the  case  supposed,  seems  to 
stand  thus : 

The  acquisition  of  the  Spanish  territories  bordering 
upon  the  United  States,  by  Britain,  would  be  danger- 
ous to  us.  And  if  there  were  a  good  prospect  that 


96 

our  refusal  would  prevent  it,  without  exposing  us  to  a 
greater  evil,  we  ought  to  refuse.  But  if  there  be  a 
considerable  probability  that  our  refusal  would  be  in- 
effectual, and  if  being  so,  it  would  involve  us  in  war  or 
disgrace,  and  if  positive  disgrace  is  worse  than  war, 
and  war,  in  our  present  situation,  worse  than  the 
chances  of  the  evils  which  may  befall  us  from  that  ac- 
quisition, then  the  conclusion  would  be  that  we  ought 
not  to  refuse.  And  this  appears  to  be  the  true  con- 
clusion to  be  drawn  from  a  comprehensive  and  accu- 
rate view  of  the  subject;  though  first  impressions  are 
on  the  other  side. 

These  reflections  also  may  be  allowed  to  come  in 
aid  of  it.  Good  or  evil  is  seldom  as  great  in  the  reality 
as  in  the  prospect.  The  mischiefs  we  apprehend  may 
not  take  place.  The  enterprise,  notwithstanding  our 
consent,  may  fail.  The  acquisition,  if  made,  may,  in 
the  progress  of  things,  be  wrested  from  its  possessors. 
These,  if  pressed  hereafter,  (and  we  are  willing  to  ac- 
cept it,)  may  deem  it  expedient  to  purchase  our  neu- 
trality by  a  cession  to  us  of  that  part  of  the  territory 
in  question,  which  borders  on  the  Mississippi,  accom- 
panied with  a  guarantee  of  the  navigation  of  that  river. 
If  nothing  of  this  sort  should  happen,  still  the  war  will 
necessarily  have  added  millions  to  the  debt  of  Britain, 
while  we  shall  be  recruiting  and  increasing  our  re- 
sources and  our  strength.  In  such  a  situation,  she 
will  have  motives  of  no  inconsiderable  force  for  not 
provoking  our  resentment.  And  a  reasonable  confi- 


97 

dence  ought  to  be  reposed  in  the  fidelity  of  the  inhab- 
itants of  the  Western  country;  in  their  attachment  to 
the  Union ;  in  their  real  interest  to  remain  a  part  of  it, 
and  in  their  sense  of  danger  from  the  attempt  to  sepa- 
rate, which,  at  every  hazard,  ought  to  be  resisted  by 
the  United  States. 

It  is  also  to  be  kept  in  view,  that  the  same  danger, 
if  not  to  the  same  extent,  will  exist,  should  the  terri- 
tories in  question  remain  in  the  hands  of  Spain. 

Besides  all  this,  if  a  war  should  ever  be  deemed  a 
less  evil  than  the  neighborhood  of  the  British  in  the 
quarter  meditated,  good  policy  would  still  seem  to  re- 
quire, as  before  intimated,  that  we  should  avoid  put- 
ting ourselves  in  a  situation  to  enter  into  it,  till  we 
had  stipulated  adequate  indemnities  and  considerations 
for  doing  so;  that  we  should  see  a  little  further  into 
the  unravelment  of  the  plot,  and  be  able  to  estimate 
what  prospect  there  would  be  by  our  interference  of 
obviating  the  evil.  It  deserves  a  reflection,  that  if  those 
territories  have  been  once  wrested  from  Spain,  she  will 
be  more  tractable  to  our  wishes,  and  more  disposed  to 
make  the  concessions  which  our  interests  require,  than 
if  they  never  passed  into  other  hands. 

A  question  occurs  here,  whether  there  be  not  a 
middle  course  between  refusal  and  consent;  to  wit,  the 
waiving  an  answer,  by  referring  the  matter  to  further 
consideration.  But  to  this  there  appear  to  be  decisive 
objections.  An  evasive  conduct  in  similar  cases  is 
never  dignified — seldom  politic.  It  would  be  likely  to 


98 

give  satisfaction  to  neither  party — to  effect  no  good — 
to  prevent  no  ill.  By  Great  Britain  it  would  probably 
be  considered  as  equivalent  to  a  refusal — as  amount- 
ing to  connivance  by  Spain — as  an  indication  of  timid- 
ity by  all  the  world. 

It  happens  that  we  have  a  post  on  the  Wabash,  down 
which  river  the  expedition,  it  is  presumable,  must  go. 
If  the  commannding  officer  at  that  post  has  no  orders 
to  the  contrary,  it  will  be  his  duty  to  interrupt  the 
passage  of  the  British  troops ;  if  he  does,  it  would  seem 
necessary  for  them,  in  order  to  the  safe  passage  of  their 
boats,  with  their  artillery,  stores,  provisions,  and  bag- 
gage, to  take  that  post.  Here  then  would  be  a  passage 
through  our  territory,  not  only  without  our  permission, 
but  with  the  capture  of  a  post  of  ours,  which  would  be 
in  effect  making  war  upon  us.  And  thus  silence,  with 
less  dignity,  would  produce  the  same  ill  consequence 
as  refusal. 

If,  to  avoid  this,  private  orders  were  to  be  sent  to 
the  commanding  officer  of  that  post,  not  to  interrupt 
the  passage,  his  not  being  punished  for  his  delinquency 
would  betray  the  fact  and  afford  proof  of  connivance. 

The  true  alternative  seems  to  be,  to  refuse  or  con- 
sent :  and  if  the  first  be  preferred,  to  accompany  it  with 
an  intimation,  in  terms  as  free  from  offence  as  possible, 
that  dispositions  will  be  made  to  oppose  the  passage, 
if  attempted  to  be  forced ;  and  accordingly,  as  far  as 
practicable,  to  make  and  execute  such  dispositions. 

If,  on  the  contrary,  consent  should  be  given,  it  may 


99 

deserve  consideration  whether  it  would  not  be  expedi- 
ent to  accompany  it  with  a  candid  intimation  that  the 
expedition  is  not  agreeable  to  us,  but  that  thinking  it 
expedient  to  avoid  an  occasion  of  controversy,  it  has 
been  concluded  not  to  withhold  assent.  There  are, 
however,  objections  to  this  mode.  In  case  of  consent, 
an  early  and  frank  explanation  should  be  given  to  Spain. 

QUESTION  THE  SECOND. — "  What  notice  ought  to  be 
taken  of  the  measure,  if  it  should  be  undertaken  with- 
out leave,  which  is  the  most  probable  proceeding  of 
the  two?" 

If  leave  should  be  asked  and  refused,  and  the  enter- 
prise should  be  prosecuted  without  it,  the  manner  of 
treating  it  has  been  anticipated;  that  is,  the  passage, 
if  practicable,  should  be  opposed;  and  if  not  practic- 
able, the  outrage  should  be  resented  by  recourse  to 
arms. 

But  if  the  enterprise  should  be  undertaken  without 
asking  leave,  which  is  presumed  to  be  the  import  of 
the  question,  then  the  proper  conduct  to  be  observed 
will  depend  upon  the  circumstances. 

As  the  passage  contemplated  would  be  by  water,  and 
almost  wholly  through  an  uninhabited  part  of  the 
country,  over  which  we  have  no  actual  jurisdiction,  if 
it  were  unaccompanied  by  any  violence  to  our  citizens 
or  posts,  it  would  seem  sufficient  to  be  content  with 
remonstrating  against  it,  but  in  a  tone  that  would  not 
commit  us  to  the  necessity  of  going  to  war;  the  ob- 
jections to  which  apply  with  full  force  here. 


100 

But  if,  as  it  is  to  be  feared  will  necessarily  be  the 
case,  our  post  on  the  Wabash  should  be  forced,  to 
make  good  their  passage,  there  seems  to  be  no  alter- 
native but  to  go  to  war  with  them,  unwelcome  as  it 
may  be.  It  seems  to  be  this,  or  absolute  and  unquali- 
fied humiliation ;  which,  as  has  been  already  noticed, 
is  in  almost  every  situation  a  greater  evil  than  war. 

In  every  event,  it  would  appear  advisable  immedi- 
ately to  convene  the  Legislature;  to  make  the  most 
vigorous  measures  for  war;  to  make  a  formal  demand 
of  satisfaction  ;  to  commence  negotiations  for  alliances  ; 
and  if  satisfaction  should  be  refused,  to  endeavor  to 
punish  the  aggressor  by  the  sword.* 

ALEXANDER  HAMILTON, 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury. 

*  The  opinion  of  Hamilton  is  of  special  interest,  as  he  had  held  some 
informal  interviews  with  Major  Beckwith  upon  the  attitude  of  the 
United  States  towards  Great  Britain  in  this  Spanish  affair.  The  nego- 
tiation of  Gouverneur  Morris  at  London  had  reached  the  ears  of  Lord 
Dorchester,  presumably  in  some  official  manner,  and  may  have  sug- 
gested to  him  the  expediency  of  sending  a  similar  agent  to  New  York 
to  sound  the  American  Executive  upon  certain  questions  then  pending 
between  England  and  the  United  States,  in  which  the  interests  of 
Canada  were  involved.  Beckwith  was  the  agent  selected,  and  on  the 
8th  of  July  he  held  his  first  communication  with  Hamilton,  and  proved 
that  he  had  a  full  acquaintance  with  Morris's  mission,  and  expressed 
the  belief  that  the  British  Cabinet  was  disposed  to  enter  into  an  alliance, 
as  well  as  friendly  intercourse,  with  the  United  States.  This  led  up  to 
a  suggestion  on  Beckwith's  part,  that,  if  war  should  occur  between  Eng- 
land and  Spain,  it  would  be  for  the  interest  of  the  United  States  to  take 
part  with  the  foriner  power.  The  points  in  dispute  between  the  United 


101 

States  and  England  were  touched  upon,  and  Indian  hostilities  disa- 
vowed by  Lord  Dorchester.  The  tenor  of  Beckwith's  communication, 
based  as  it  was  upon  a  letter  from  Lord  Dorchester,  was  such  as  to 
convey  the  impression  that  it  was  not  made  without  some  knowledge 
and  probable  suggestion  on  the  part  of  the  English  Cabinet. 

Hamilton  noted  down  the  main  points  of  this  conversation,  and  sub- 
mitted them  to  the  President  and  Jefferson.  The  first  views  of  the 
latter  have  already  been  given  in  these  pages  (p.  65,  ante),  but  they 
were  more  distinct  and  sharply  defined  in  this  draft  than  as  afterwards 
expressed.  In  the  draft  he  says  the  alliance  proposed  "would  involve 
us  against  France  and  Spain;  and,  considered  even  in  amoral  view,  no 
price  could  repay  such  an  abandonment  of  character."  In  the  com- 
pleted paper  this  is  toned  down  to  "as  to  an  alliance,  we  can  say  noth- 
ing till  its  object  be  shown,  and  that  it  is  not  to  be  inconsistent  with  ex- 
isting engagements."  But  all  agreed  that  in  the  event  of  war  the 
United  States  expected  to  be  strictly  neutral. 

With  this  opinion,  Hamilton  again  met  Beck  with  on  the  22d  of  July. 
As  the  British  agent  had  no  particulars  of  an  alliance  to  offer  as  the 
basis  of  a  negotiation,  Hamilton  said  that  "  the  thing  is  in  too  general 
a  form  to  admit  of  a  judgment  of  what  may  be  eventually  admissible  or 
practicable.  If  the  subject  shall  hereafter  present  itself  to  discussion  in 
an  authentic  and  proper  shape,  I  have  no  doubt  we  shall  be  ready  to 
converse  freely  upon  it.  And  you  will  naturally  conclude  that  we  shall 
be  disposed  to  pursue  whatever  shall  appear,  under  all  circumstances, 
to  be  our  interest,  as  far  as  may  consist  with  our  honor.  At  present,  1 
would  not  mean  either  to  raise  or  depress  expectation. 

"Major  Beckwith  seemed  to  admit  that,  as  things  were  circum- 
stancd,  nothing  explicit  could  be  expected,  and  went  on  to  make  some 
observations,  which  I  understood  as  having  for  object  to  sound  whether 
there  existed  any  connection  between  Spain  and  us ;  and  whether  the 
questions  with  regard  to  the  Mississippi  were  settled. 

"  Perceving  this,  I  thought  it  best  to  avoid  an  appearance  of  mystery, 
and  to  declare  without  hesitation, 

" « That  there  was  no  particular  connection  between  Spain  and  the 
United  States  within  my  knowledge,  and  that  it  was  matter  of  public 
notoriety,  that  the  questions  alluded  to  were  still  unadjusted.'  " 


IO2 

Mr.  Douglas  Brymner,  the  courteous  archivist  of  the  Dominion  of 
Canada,  informs  me  that  the  letters  of  Major  Beckwith  to  Lord  Dor- 
chester on  his  American  mission  are  still  in  existence,  but  not  in  a  con- 
dition in  which  they  are  available.  I  am  therefore  unable  to  give 
the  Major's  versions  of  these  conversations. 

When,  in  October,  Hamilton  received  the  decree  of  the  French 
Assembly  addressed  to  Spain  (page  26,  ante),  he  thought  that  "  though 
of  a  qualified  tenor,"  it  looked  "  pretty  directly  towards  the  eventual 
supporting  of  Spain." — Hamilton  to  Washington,  17  October,  1790. 


OPINION  OF  THE    SECRETARY  OF  WAR. 

WAR  OFFICE,  29  August,  1790. 

SIR:  In  answer  to  your  secret  communication  of 
the  27th  instant,  and  the  questions  stated  therein,  I 
humbly  beg  leave  to  observe, 

That  the  United  States,  by  not  being  under  the  ob- 
ligation of  any  treaty,  either  with  Spain  or  England, 
are  in  a  situation,  to  grant,  or  deny,  the  passage  of 
troops,  through  their  territory,  as  they  shall  judge  fit. 

The  granting  or  refusing  therefore  the  expected 
demand  of  a  free  passage  to  the  troops  of  England, 
through  the  territory  of  the  United  States,  in  order  to 
attack  the  dominions  of  Spain  upon  the  Mississippi, 
will  depend  upon  a  due  estimation  of  the  consequences 
arising  from  either  alternative. 

The  United  States  are  too  well  aware,  of  the  great 
and  permanent  evils,  which  would  result  from  Eng- 
land's becoming  possessed  of  the  Mississippi  and  West 
Florida,  to  concur  in  any  arrangements  to  facilitate 
that  event. 

The  law  of  nations  establish  the  principle,  that  every 
neutral  nation  may,  refuse  the  passage  of  troops 
through  its  territory,  when  such  passage  may  tend  to 
its  injury. 

In  the  present  case,  the  passage  of  the  British  troops, 
would  be  to  effect  an  object  directly  contrary  to  the 


104 

interests  and  welfare  of  the  United  States.  If  there- 
fore the  demand  should  be  made,  it  may  be  refused, 
consistently  with  the  principles  of  self  preservation, 
and  the  law  of  nations. 

But  there  are  two  modes  of  refusal.  A  denial  un- 
accompanied by  any  other  act ;  and  a  denial  accom- 
panied by  force  to  oppose  the  passage,  if  it  should  be 
attempted,  after  having  been  refused. 

The  first  mode  is  all  that  can  with  propriety  be  done 
in  the  present  state  of  things.  If  after  the  denial,  the 
british  troops  should  proceed,  they  become  the  aggres- 
sors, and  establish  a  just  cause  of  war,  whenever  the 
interests  of  the  United  States  shall  dictate  the  measure. 
Although  a  denial,  unaccompanied  by  any  other  act, 
might  be  unpleasant  to  great  Britain,  yet  she  would 
not  probably  think  it,  of  itself,  a  sufficient  cause  for 
waging  war  against  the  United  States.  But  if  a  force 
should  be  actually  opposed  to  the  passage  of  the 
troops,  a  war  with  great  Britain  would  appear  to  be 
the  inevitable  and  immediate  consequence. 

The  true  interests  of  the  United  States  dictate  a 
state  of  neutrality  in  the  affairs  between  Spain  and 
England.  Should  the  United  States  be  dragged  into 
the  war  in  the  present  moment,  the  loss  of  their  com- 
merce might  justly  be  expected;  the  source  of  their 
revenue  would  be  cut  off,  and  the  proposed  system  of 
public  credit  fatally  postponed,  if  not  entirely  blasted. 
These  are  serious  evils  and  to  be  avoided  if  possible. 

It  is  however  to  be  remarked  that  it  is  highly  im- 


105 

probable  that  Spain  would  enter  into  the  war,  unless 
she  expected  to  be  supported  by  France.  Nor  does 
there  appear  any  solid  objections  to  the  expectation, 
but  the  present  debilitated  and  convulsed  state  of 
France.  The  family  compact  and  other  treaties  be- 
tween the  two  kingdoms  will  continue  to  exist,  not- 
withstanding the  situation  of  France,  until  formally 
renounced.  This  has  not  been  the  case.  The  prob- 
ability therefore  is,  that  France  will  be  combined  with 
Spain. 

If  this  should  be  the  case,  every  effort  on  the  part  of 
France  will  be  employed  to  associate  America  in  the 
war.  And  it  is  a  question  of  great  moment  whether 
the  United  States  could  strictly  comply  with  the 
treaty  of  friendship  and  commerce  entered  into  with 
France  on  the  6th  of  February,  and  observe  an  exact 
neutrality. 

Although  it  would  seem  hardly  possible  that  either 
England,  or  France  and  Spain  combined,  would  make 
such  offers  to  the  United  States  as  to  counter-balance 
the  advantages  of  Neutrality,  yet  the  case  may  be 
otherwise,  or  the  United  States  may  be  so  obliged  to 
enter  into  the  war  in  order  to  avert  a  greater  evil. 

These  considerations  with  their  extensive  relations 
unite  in  dictating  an  answer  to  Lord  Dorchester  in 
terms  as  little  exceptionable  as  possible. 

That  the  United  States  had  recently  manifested 
their  sincere  desires,  not  only  to  continue  at  peace 
with  Great  Britain,  but  to  cement  the  same  by  com- 
8 


io6 

mercial  arrangements  which  might  be  reciprocally 
beneficial. 

But  that  the  real  causes  of  dispute  between  England 
and  Spain  were  too  little  understood  at  present  by  the 
United  States  for  the  President  to  consent  to  a  meas- 
ure which  would  seem  to  be  inconsistent  with  that 
strict  neutrality  the  United  States  would  desire  to 
observe. 

But  if  notwithstanding  this  answer,  or  if  no  request 
should  be  made  for  the  purpose,  and  the  troops  march 
through  the  territory  of  the  United  States,  to  attack 
the  dominions  of  Spain,  it  might  be  proper  for  the 
President  of  the  United  States  to  convene  imme- 
diately the  legislature,  if  the  occasion  should  be  so 
urgent  as  to  require  their  meeting  at  an  earlier  day 
than  the  adjournment,  and  to  lay  the  whole  affair  be- 
fore them,  with  his  opinion  of  the  measures  to  be  pur- 
sued. For  the  Congress  are  vested  with  the  right  of 
providing  for  the  common  defence,  and  of  declaring 
war,  and  of  consequence  they  should  possess  the  in- 
formation of  all  facts  and  circumstances  thereunto 
appertaining. 

In  the  mean  time  the  dispositions  and  designs  of 
the  contending  parties  will  unfold  themselves.  The 
terms  of  each  side  be  known  and  estimated,  and  the 
United  States  better  able  than  at  present  to  judge  of 
the  exact  line  of  conduct  they  ought  to  pursue. 

I  have  the  honor  with  perfect  Respect  to  be  Sir 
Your  humble  Servant  H.  KNOX. 

The  President  of  the  United  States, 


INDEX. 


Adams,  John,  reply  to  the  President,  45. 
Aranda,  Count,  33. 

Barbeyrac,  70,  71. 

Beckwith,  Major  George,  41,  66,  67  note,  100  note, 

Blount,  William,  42. 

Browning,  Oscar,  27. 

Brymner,  Douglas,  102. 

Cabarras,  Count,  38. 
Campo,  Marquis  del,  29  note,  32,  39. 
Campomanes,  Compte  de,  40. 
Carmichael,  William,  17,  32,  34,  36,  37. 
Cherokee  Chiefs  in  London,  31. 
Clark,  looting  a  Spanish  store,  II. 
Connolly's  mission,  61. 

Diplomacy  of  the  Revolution,  7,  48,  49. 
Dorchester,  Lord,  30,  43,  46,  53,  100  note, 

Elliot,  Hugh,  27. 

Family  compact  of  France  and  Spain,  24,  26. 
Fitzherbert,  Alleyne,  19,  24,  32. 
Florida  Blanca,  9,  24,  28,  32. 
France,  aid  to  United  States,  77. 
French  Revolution,  felt  in  Spain,  34. 

Galvez,  Comptesse,  34. 
Gardoqui,  9,  16,  17. 
Gower,  Earl,  25,  26,  27,  28. 
Gratitude,  77. 

(107) 


io8 

Great  Britain,  7,  22,  41,  47. 
Green,  10,  II. 
Grotius,  70,  71,  72. 

Hamilton,  Alexander,  28  note,  68,  69,  loo. 
Humphreys,  David,  21,  31,  32,  36. 

Jay,  John,  9,  10,  44,  50. 

Jefferson,  Thomas,  17,  19,  21,  41,  56,  59,  60,  65. 

King,  Rufus,  29  note. 
Knox,  Henry,  103. 

Lacy,  General,  34. 
Lear,  Tobias,  29  note, 
Leeds,  Duke  of,  39,  48. 

Madison,  James,  10,  14. 

Mirabeau,  24,  25,  28. 

Miranda,  Compte,  29  note. 

Mississippi,  navigation  of,  10,  15,  16,  22,  32,  36. 

Montmorin,  27,  33. 

Morris,  Gouverneur,  17,  29  note,  39,  40. 

Neckar,  27. 

Neutrality,  policy  of  the  United  States,  20. 

Nootka  Sound,  18,  29. 

Otto,  17. 

Parker,  Daniel,  29  note. 
Puffendorf,  70,  71. 

Queen  of  Spain,  33,  34. 

S6gur,  Compte,  34. 

Smith,  Wiltiam  I.,  29  note. 

Society  of  1789,  25. 

Spain,  8,  9,  18,  23,  24,  32,  34,  35,  40,  75,  80. 


log 
Treaty  of  1783,  8,  9,  10. 

Vattel,  51,  70,  73,  76. 
Viar,  Jose  Ignacio  de,  17. 

Washington,  George,  10,  20,  30,  43. 
Western  Territory,  10,  II,  12. 
West  Indies,  25,  81. 


P7I 


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